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ASHES TO ASHES: A WAY HOME FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE SURVIVORS
Kenneth S. Klein*

“Wow! Yet another big storm heading to Puerto Rico. Will it ever end?”
-Twitter post of President Donald Trump, August 27, 20191
In 2020, the United States suffered a record number of named storms, a record
number of storms causing $1 billion or more in damage, a derecho that destroyed
much of Iowa’s corn crop, and previously unheard-of levels of wildfire frequency
and damage in California, Oregon, and Washington. The effects of climate change
are causing a crisis of affordable, available homeowner insurance. As more and
more homes in the United States are in high-risk areas for natural catastrophes,
insurers increasingly choose not to offer insurance at all in some communities,
exclude disaster risks from coverage in others, and dramatically raise prices in still
others. For ever-growing numbers of homeowners, the only option is an inadequate
and unattractive public insurance product of last resort. As a result, growing
numbers of climate change survivors are finding there is no way home.
Building on three recent proposals from regulators and prominent academics to
solve the problem of affordability and availability, this Article provides a novel
*
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time and knowledge. Thanks to Professor Catherine Hardee at California Western School of
Law, whose counsel made this Article infinitely better. Thanks as well to Professor Lisa Black
at California Western School of Law, who served as a sounding board for this Article every
step of the way. Thanks to the Author’s writing circle at California Western School of Law—
CWSL Professors Bob Bohrer, Paul Gudel, Susan Bisom-Rapp and Tim Casey; CWSL Dean
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Bloomington. Thanks to excellent student research assistant Caden Shophammer. Finally,
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made this Article better.
1.
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2019, 12:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1166382203808440320 [https://www.thetrump
archive.com/?searchbox=%22Wow%21+Yet+another+big+storm+heading+to+Puerto+Rico
.+Will+it+ever+end%22].
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solution: first, establish a requirement that an insurer who offers homeowner
hazard insurance anywhere in a state must offer it everywhere, with no exception—
full stop. Second, adopt state rules providing that rate filings or form filings for
homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance would exclude
any natural disaster peril. Third, adopt state rules providing that rate filings for
homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance discriminates
against homes based on the location of the home.
By building a set of market incentives to sell affordable, comprehensive insurance
everywhere and protecting insurers from price-cutting by competitors, insurance
will be affordable everywhere and will be available everywhere. Insurers will want
to sell it, and homeowners will be able to buy it. And virtually all homes in the United
States will have access to affordable insurance for the next peril, regardless of what
it may be.
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INTRODUCTION
As natural disasters grow in frequency and impact, there is a crisis of
available and affordable homeowner insurance in the United States. Reports abound
of insurers refusing to sell insurance at any price in some communities and
exploding the price of insurance in other communities.2 No solution has yet
emerged. As a result, the victims and survivors of climate change lack the resources
to rebuild and re-insure the homes they lost. This Article proposes an architecture
for restructuring insurance markets so that even as natural catastrophes multiply,
there is a viable avenue to homeowner insurance that insurers can and will sell, and
that homeowners can and will buy.
The problem is an insurance crisis, not an insurer crisis. Insurers are neither
charities nor churches. Insurers do not exist to promote either social justice or
morality. Rather, insurers are acting exactly as they need to act to be profitable
businesses.3 Insurers will not intentionally sell actuarially unsound homeowner
insurance. And so in the homeowner hazard insurance market, just as with any other
2.
See, e.g., Susan Salisbury, Storm Season on the Horizon, Insurance Market in
Crisis as Homeowners Face Huge Increases, PALM BEACH POST (May 7, 2021), https://www.
palmbeachpost.com/story/news/local/2021/05/07/insurance-market-crisis-homeownersface-double-digit-increases/4977002001/
[https://perma.cc/6747-CL69]
(“Florida
homeowners are being hit with double-digit percentage insurance rate increases, and the
insurance market has reached a crisis stage.”); Amy O’Connor, Citizens’ CEO: Florida
Property Insurance Market is Shutting Down, INS. J. (March 19, 2021),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2021/03/19/606052.htm [https://perma.
cc/EY6E-AUT6] (“Florida’s insurer of last resort . . . has become the insurer of first resort as
. . . the private homeowners insurance market continues its downward spiral. . . . [F]our
companies in Florida are now closed for new business; at least 12 companies have strict
underwriting restrictions . . . . [C]arriers are offsetting their losses with rate increases.”); Dale
Kasler, ‘Last Resort’ Insurance Plan Raising Rates for Rural California Homeowners—
Again, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 8, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/
california/fires/article247680725.html (“Thousands of rural Californians have lost
homeowners’ insurance in recent years because of rising wildfire claims, forcing them to seek
alternative coverage that’s two or three times more expensive. Now their rates are about to
go even higher.”); Alicja Grzadkowska, Insurance for Properties in High-risk Wildfires
Zones has ‘Dried Up’, INS. BUS. AM. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.
com/us/news/specialty-insurance/insurance-for-properties-in-highrisk-wildfires-zones-hasdried-up-211128.aspx [https://perma.cc/U5CP-VTRX].
3.
See generally Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1400–16
(1994).
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insurance market with highly variable risk profiles of potential insureds (for
example, auto, life, or health insurance), an insurer who does not isolate high-risk
insureds will not last long in the marketplace.4 For homeowners in areas prone to
fire, flood, or other catastrophe risk, this means insurance is increasingly too
expensive, if it is offered at all.5 Mitigation of climate change itself will help, as will
mitigation of the risk to communities and homes (fire-hardening land and
structures)—but not comprehensively enough, and not at a pace that will avert the
insurance crisis.6 Nor is poor public insurance of last resort an adequate answer.7
The necessity of ubiquitously and adequately insuring all natural disaster
losses could not be more pressing (although it will probably be more pressing as
soon as next year, no matter what year a reader is reading this). Aon, an international
insurer, estimates that 2019 weather events (defined by Aon as flooding, tropical
cyclone, severe weather, drought, wildfire, winter weather, earthquake, and EU
windstorm) totaled $232 billion in economic losses (with slightly over half of
insured losses occurring in the United States), which is actually slightly down from
the twenty-first century average.8 These losses included a 69% global protection
gap, meaning the gap between total economic insurable losses and total insured
losses.9 Forty-one events caused at least $1 billion in losses, of which a dozen were
billion-dollar insured loss events.10 In the United States, total economic losses were
4.
See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry, II, Managing Hurricane (and Other Natural
Disaster) Risk, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 391, 427, 447–52 (2019).
5.
See infra note 17.
6.
See generally Christopher C. French, America on Fire: Climate Change,
Wildfires & Insuring Natural Catastrophes, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 817, 841–46 (2020).
7.
See generally Arthur Charpentier & Benoit Le Maux, Natural Catastrophe
Insurance: How Should the Government Intervene?, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2014); Report
Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe
Insurance in the United States, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 2015), https://home.
treasury.gov/system/files/311/Natural%20Catastrophe%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
ZL8S-Y6QJ]; Christopher Flavelle, Can Insurance Protect Us from Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2020, at D5 (“The obvious approach might be to let insurance work the way
it’s meant to . . . . But homeowners vote.”); Chris Lafakis, Laura Ratz, Emily Fazio & Maria
Cosma, The Economic Implications of Climate Change, MOODY’S ANALYTICS 11 (June 2019),
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/economic-implications-of-climatechange.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW66-FX4Y] (“Every dollar that federal lawmakers
appropriate for disaster relief is a dollar that could have otherwise been spent on Social
Security, Medicare, national defense, or rebated as a tax cut. Natural disasters drain the federal
government of resources and exacerbate the nation’s fiscal situation.”); see also Jim Saunders,
Florida Leaders Try to Tame Soaring Property-insurance Premiums with Reform Bill,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
business/real-estate/os-bz-property-insurance-changes-florida-20210430-ojpyun2b4jdujehx
nzrfxuclqq-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z8HA-GY6Z].
8.
Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, AON 3 (2020),
http://thoughtleadership.aon.com/Documents/20200122-if-natcat2020.pdf?utm_source=
ceros&utm_medium=storypage&utm_campaign=natcat20 [https://perma.cc/DKG4-TGR9].
9.
Id. at 7; accord Facts + Statistics: Global Catastrophes, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-global-catastrophes [https://perma.cc/5CNGTMG2] (last visited July 31, 2021).
10.
Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 1.
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$68 billion, of which $36 billion were insured (again, with 2019 being a better than
average year, down by 15% from twenty-first century averages).11 In 2020, the
losses in the United States returned to trending up: “Insured losses from major
natural catastrophes totaled about $78 billion . . . [,] the fourth-largest total since
2011 and about 17% higher than the 10-year average of $66.5 billion . . . .”12
California “fire season” in 2020 essentially was the entirety of the year.13 As
reported internally within the insurance industry, “2020 set a record for the number
of U.S. catastrophic events. The 2020 catastrophes included 19 events with at least
$1 billion in direct insured losses in the United States . . . .”14
Simply put, the frequency, intensity, and economic consequences of natural
disasters is bad and getting worse, both globally and domestically.15 It is a national
problem.16 Insurance is seen as one of a very few possible tools to ameliorate the

11.
Id. at 37.
12.
Matthew Lerner, Insured Natural Catastrophe Losses Reached $78B in 2020:
Report, BUS. INS. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20210202/
NEWS06/912339524/Insured-natural-catastrophe-losses-reached-$78B-in-2020-ReportWillis-Re [https://perma.cc/FB96-G5U5].
13.
Incidences, CAL. FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2020/ [https://
perma.cc/N8PH-8CW7] (last visited July 31, 2021).
14.
P/C Insurers’ Net Income for 9 Months Fell 27% on Effects of Catastrophes,
INS. J. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/02/09/600598.
htm [https://perma.cc/8967-J2ER].
15.
See, e.g., Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NOAA,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/ [https://perma.cc/3SX2-EQNG] (last visited July 31,
2021); Steve Jackson, Actuaries Climate Risk Index, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES ii (Jan. 2020),
https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/ACRI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C844C86M]; Spring 2020 Data Update to the Actuaries Climate Index, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES 2,
https://actuariesclimateindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ACI-Press-Release-Dec2020-FINAL_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/25W9-M3V3] (last visited July 31, 2021). See
generally W.J. Wouter Botzen et al., The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Review
of Models and Empirical Studies, 13 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 167 (2019); Stuart Fraser et
al., The Making of a Riskier Future: How Our Decisions Are Shaping Future Disaster Risk,
GLOB. FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION & RECOVERY, https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/
default/files/publication/Riskier%20Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CH2-LEPT] (last visited
Aug. 23, 2021).
16.
See, e.g., Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market
for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 57 (“Every region of
the United States is vulnerable to natural catastrophes. In general, the number of natural
catastrophe events per year and the associated economic losses are increasing and, as a result,
attention to natural catastrophe insurance programs has increased as well.”); 2020 Insurance
Fact Book, INS. INFO. INST. 139––43 (2020), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/
insurance_factbook_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT5D-YRDS]; see also Kristina Dahl et al.,
Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for Coastal Real Estate,
UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 5 (2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/
2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TS8-69TD] (“By 2045 . . .
nearly 311,000 of today’s residential properties, currently home to more than half a million
people, would be at risk of flooding chronically . . . . For about 30 communities, properties
accounting for more than half of the local property tax base today would be at risk by 2045.”);
French, supra note 6, at 823 (and sources cited therein).
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economic impacts of natural disasters, but at present, in many communities
insurance for catastrophe is unaffordable or unavailable.17
All human activity is subject to degradation by natural catastrophes.18
Some (not all) of these impacts are insurable, meaning there is a private insurance
policy of some type that will cover the loss; the potential coverages are manifold:
life, disability, business interruption, health, real property, personal property,
automobile, commercial, residential, and workers compensation, among others.19
This Article confines its focus to insurance to reconstruct an owner-occupied home.
In the twentieth century, privately insuring one’s home was not an issue.
And for many, it still isn’t. Over the past 30 years, homeowner insurance never has
accounted for even 1% of average household consumer spending.20 Take-up rates of
homeowner insurance, meaning the percentage of possible insureds who actually
purchase coverage, always has been above 90% of all homeowners.21 A steadily
decreasing percentage of homeowners—by 2016, less than one-third—identify
homeowner insurance as a financial burden.22
Perhaps counter-intuitively, natural disasters have not yet overly stressed
the profitability of private insurers. At the 2019 Spring National Meeting of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), at the same time that
a representative of AIR Worldwide23 presented to the Catastrophe Risk Subgroup
that in 2017 and 2018 wildfire losses dwarfed any prior year, Matt Mosher (Chief
Operating Officer of AM Best) in his Comments on Wildfire Risk, described a
financially healthy industry despite the high cost of catastrophe-related, covered
losses:

17.
See French, supra note 6, at 831–38 (and sources cited therein); The
Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential Property
Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of California: CDI
Summary and Proposed Solutions, CAL. DEP’T INS. 1, 5 (2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/upload/nr002-2018AvailabilityandAffordabilityof
WildfireCoverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZS7-SYM5]; The Potential Impact of Climate
Change on Insurance Regulation, NAIC 4 (2008), https://content.naic.org/sites/
default/files/inline-files/cipr_potential_impact_climate_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W3CCT6X].
18.
See, e.g., Lafakis et al., supra note 7, at 4; Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate
Adaptation: A Review of the Economic Costs of Natural Disasters, 46 ENERGY ECON. 576,
577–78 (2014).
19.
Kousky, supra note 18.
20.
2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 213.
21.
See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
22.
Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices,
INS. INFO. INST. 3 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulse-wp020217-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5XJ-9JCL].
23.
AIR is a wholly owned subsidiary of Verisk, which also is the parent of the
ISO. Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 4–5 (2020), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001442145/c43067a5c931-4f62-ae7c-4eefe875abcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAT4-U8J2]. The core competency of
AIR is modeling catastrophe risk. Our Story, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/aboutair/Our-Story/ [https://perma.cc/L3TQ-RDVS] (last visited July 31, 2021).
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“Gross losses were below state-wide market share modeled
estimates.”
“Reinsurance responded appropriately.”
The “vast majority of companies absorbed 2017 & 2018 losses
without impact to ratings.”
The “micro-concentration of risks led to a few negative rating
actions.”24
Even in the very difficult insurance environment of 2020—a pandemic,
civil unrest, near-constant wildfires in the West,25 a derecho in the Midwest that
destroyed much of Iowa’s corn crop,26 and a record number of both named storms
and over $1 billion of damage in the East27—Property and Casualty insurance did
“surprisingly well,” was profitable, and projected continued profits in 2021.28 That
24.
Matt Mosher, AM Best Comments on Wildfire Risk, NAIC 8 (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://naic-cms.org/sites/default/files/national_meeting/cmte_e_cat_risk_sg_2019_spring_
nm_materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBE7-XG44].
25.
Incidences, supra note 13.
26.
Iowa Derecho Claims Top $1.6 Billion, IOWA INS. DIV. (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://iid.iowa.gov/press-releases/iowa-derecho-claims-top-16-billion
[https://perma.cc/
R79J-TRRU]; Andrea May Sahouri, $7.5 Billion and Counting: August Derecho That
Slammed Iowa Was Most Costly Thunderstorm in US History, Data Shows, DES MOINES REG.
(Oct. 17, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2020/10/17/
iowas-august-derecho-most-costly-thunderstorm-us-history-7-5-billion-damages/36950
53001/ [https://perma.cc/46N9-T4FY]; Bob Henson, Iowa Derecho in August Was Most
Costly Thunderstorm Disaster in U.S. History,
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/10/17/iowa-derecho-damage-cost/?utm_
source=I.I.I.+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=f6b9df9f0f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_
09_28_02_24_COPY_01&utm_medium=email
[https://perma.cc/96MP-J3ME];
Rod
Boshart, Derecho 2020: Insurance Pays Over $3 Billion in Derecho Claims to Iowans so Far,
QUAD-CITY TIMES (Aug. 10, 2021), https://qctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/
derecho-2020-insurance-pays-over-3-billion-in-derecho-claims-to-iowans-so-far/article_
9ffed592-6d2e-5773-9eb3-b65ae56c7518.html [https://perma.cc/5DF6-GGAU].
27.
Record Number of Billion-dollar Disasters Struck U.S. in 2020, NOAA (Jan.
8, 2021), https://www.noaa.gov/stories/record-number-of-billion-dollar-disasters-struck-usin-2020 [https://perma.cc/MW9Q-EFZY].
28.
Loretta Worters, Triple-I/Milliman Groundhog Day Report Projects Insurer
Growth, Profits in 2021, INS. INFO. INST.: TRIPLE-I BLOG (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/triple-i-milliman-groundhog-day-report-projectsinsurer-growth-profits-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/N42Z-LALL]. To put this in more
perspective, reinsurance is an important component to the ability and willingness of insurers
to insure catastrophe risk. See generally Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State
of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 4;
Alejandro Drexler & Richard Rosen, Exposure to Catastrophe Risk and Use of Reinsurance:
An Empirical Evaluation for the U.S., SPRINGER LINK (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-020-00186-3 (posting by Geneva Ass’n on
Risk & Insurance: Issues & Practice for open access). In 2021, Bermuda insurers and
reinsurers asserted, “Bermuda is the largest supplier of catastrophe reinsurance to US
insurers.” Why Bermuda, ASSOC. BERMUDA INSURERS & REINSURERS, https://www.abir.bm/
why-bermuda/ [https://perma.cc/3UZB-PPHQ] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021). In 2020,
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said, while in the first three quarters of 2020 Property and Casualty insurance
remained profitable, net underwriting income (as opposed to income from
investment return) dropped 27%.29 Nonetheless, industry observers projected Year
2021 to have continued underwriting profitability.30
But maintaining industry profitability has come at a price to homeowners.
In an August 20, 2019 press release entitled FACT SHEET: Impact of Wildfires on
Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability, the California Department of Insurance
(“CDI”) described how, in response to wildfires in 2017, California private fire
insurance for homes was becoming unaffordable, if available at all.31 In the fall of
2020, the California Insurance Commissioner doubled down on these concerns,
convening a “Virtual Investigatory Hearing on Homeowners’ Insurance Availability
and Affordability.”32 The Washington Insurance Commissioner discussed
catastrophe and its impact on insurance affordability and availability in his opening
remarks in his Climate 2020 Summit in October.33 The Louisiana Insurance
Commissioner was quoted in November of 2020 saying he expected homeowner
insurance rates to rise 5%–10% because of the year’s hurricane experience.34 In
2021, Floridians faced double-digit insurance premium increases, even in the
absence of major storms hitting Florida during the hurricane season of 2020.35 This

“Bermuda’s reinsurance sector was hit by more catastrophe losses than costs from the
COVID-19 pandemic . . . .” Steve Evans, Catastrophes Outweigh Pandemic Losses for
Bermuda
Reinsurers
in
2020,
ARTEMIS
(Mar.
11,
2021),
https://www.artemis.bm/news/catastrophes-outweigh-pandemic-losses-for-bermudareinsurers-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/Y9GX-U945].
29.
P/C Insurers’ Net Income for 9 Months Fell 27% on Effects of Catastrophes,
supra note 14.
30.
Déjà Vu: P/C Insurance Challenges for 2021 Look Much Like 2020’s, Says
AM Best, INS. J. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/02/
25/602819.htm [https://perma.cc/8RHW-LRZ9].
31.
Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability,
CAL. DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2019/upload/
nr063_factsheetwildfire.pdf [https://perma.cc/B84E-UR8L] (last visited July 30, 2021).
32.
Invitation to Virtual Investigatory Hearing on Homeowners’ Insurance
Availability and Affordability, CAL. DEP’T INS. 1 (Sept. 16, 2020), http://www.insurance.
ca.gov/01-consumers/200-wrr/upload/Invitation-to-Virtual-Investigatory-Hearing-onHomeowners-Insurance-Availability-and-Affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WSZ-NJ33].
33.
Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Climate Summit
2020 - Opening Remarks: Washington State Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJan_Nt3uSQ.
34.
Thanh Truong, Homeowners Insurance Rates Could Rise 10% After Disasterheavy 2020, 4WWL (Nov. 6, 2020, 11:48 AM) https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/local/
homeowners-insurance-rates-could-rise-10-next-year-after-disaster-heavy-2020/289-290b
247b-7524-4b28-9077-8a91bce78d1a [https://perma.cc/4RDC-BHK6].
35.
Suzanne Barlyn, Florida Consumers ‘Flabbergasted’ as Property Insurers
Push for Double-digit Rate Hikes, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2021, 4:09 AM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-insurance-florida/florida-consumers-flabbergasted-as-property-insurerspush-for-double-digit-rate-hikes-idUSKBN2AC111 [https://perma.cc/X3MJ-AZBD].
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phenomenon is being felt in the Midwest as well.36 More and more insurers are
shedding entire communities of homes from their portfolios and dramatically raising
premiums on others.37 These insurers leave homeowners with no choice but to be
uninsured or to purchase public insurance of last resort (which typically has less
coverage and higher cost).38 The Insurance Information Institute characterizes this
reliance on government programs as an “unsustainable” response to natural
disasters.39
This Article describes three recent, smart proposals to resolve the
homeowner insurance crisis. In 2018, the CDI published a proposed legislative
package addressing affordability by essentially requiring homeowners to build
fortified homes, and addressing availability by regulatory oversight to make sure
insurers fairly “score” a wildfire risk.40 Also in 2018, Professor Howard Kunreuther
proposed that states refuse rate filings other than “All Perils” insurance,41 and that
price inequity be resolved through state-funded vouchers.42 And in 2020, Professor
Christopher French argued that the solution is a government-run, national,
undistorted43 All Perils insurance that essentially would be the spiritual homeownerinsurance equivalent of the United Kingdom’s National Health Service.44
The challenge of these differing approaches is there is reason for concern
about whether any actually can work. The CDI proposal does not address any peril
other than fire, and does not offer any reason to believe that mitigation can solve
36.
See Khalil Maycock, What Is a Non-renewal Insurance Notice and Why Do
Iowa Homeowners Get Them?, WE ARE IOWA (Feb. 22, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.
weareiowa.com/article/money/iowa-insurance-division-explains-non-renewal-noticesclaims-history-impact/524-ac25e8f1-26c6-4204-832f-b1dc87c75fb1
[https://perma.cc/
RUK4-JFQW].
37.
See, e.g., James Bikales, Can ‘Fire Hardening’ Solve California’s Home
Insurance Crisis?, CAL MATTERS (Dec. 9, 2020), https://calmatters.org/environment/
california-wildfires/2020/12/homeowners-insurers-fire-science/?utm_source=I.I.I.+Daily+
Newsletter&utm_campaign=107474f209-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_12_07_02_12_
COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_092139a76a-107474f209-122627950
[https://perma.cc/ZV25-WQ5M]; accord Howard Kunreuther, All-Hazards Homeowners
Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 141, 145–46 (2018)
(describing private insurers pulling out of Florida and California following hurricanes and
earthquakes, respectively).
38.
See generally Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the
Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 14–15, 18–
26.
39.
Flood: Beyond Risk Transfer, INS. INFO. INST. (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://www.iii.org/white-paper/flood-beyond-risk-transfer-042921/ [https://perma.cc/5TAJW2YW].
40.
The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 6–11.
41.
All Perils insurance is insurance for any weather peril, without exclusion of
coverage of, for example, flood or earthquake damage.
42.
Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 141, 147–52.
43.
Undistorted means that cost is averaged across high-risk and low-risk
communities, rather than isolating homes for cost purposes into high-risk pools.
44.
Cf. French, supra note 6, at 817–18.
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affordability in high-risk communities. Kunreuther offers no structural mechanism
to assure either affordability or availability in high-risk communities. French’s
proposal gives no guidance or real expectation that it could navigate the political
headwinds of an industry that has no wish to be supplanted.
This Article offers a three-point proposal that addresses all these concerns:
first, require that an insured who offers homeowner hazard insurance anywhere in a
state must offer it everywhere, with no exception—full stop. Second, adopt state
rules providing that rate filings45 or form filings (proposed allowed insurance forms)
for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance would
exclude any natural disaster peril from its coverage. Third, adopt state rules
providing that rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if
the insurance discriminates against homes based on the location of the home.
This architecture is not a flight of fancy; it is politically realistic and
recognizes the business necessities of insurance companies. And it structures a
private market that protects insurers from price-cutting competitors who either
exclude risks or price risk by isolating some communities into high-risk pools.
Consequently, All Perils coverage priced in broad, undistorted risk pools becomes a
highly profitable product.
Nor is this proposal a panacea. While it will dramatically lower insurance
costs for insureds in high-risk communities, it will raise premiums slightly on the
rest of insureds. And this is just one of the political pressure points that this proposal
will have to navigate.
But in the end, the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. This proposal
would result in insurance that will be affordable everywhere, available everywhere,
marketable for insurers, and attractive to homeowners.
Part I of this Article describes the premises on which this Article rests. Part
II describes the current landscape (and inadequacies) of privately insuring U.S.
homes for catastrophe. Part III describes hints of a solution that come from current
market structures. Part IV describes extant proposals to make homeowner insurance
for natural catastrophes affordable and available. Part V describes why those
proposals likely won’t work. Part VI proposes for an architecture that could work.
Part VII addresses some anticipated criticisms of the proposal of this Article.

I. THE NECESSARY PREDICATES THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN
ANY PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AFFORDABILITY/ACCOUNTABILITY
There are three premises that must be accounted for by any proposal to
address the crisis in affordability and availability of insurance. Each premise should
be obvious and yet sometimes one or both are not considered.

45.
A rate filing is any time an insurer defends and seeks state approval to sell a
particular insurance-policy type at a particular price.
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First, insurers are pulling out of markets only because they cannot operate
profitably in those markets.46 Insurers are economic actors seeking profit and
responding to incentives. In the United States, regulators and legislators should not
and cannot force a private insurer to write coverage or to price risk at a loss. But if
regulators or legislators construct a market that allows insurers to cover risk
affordably and profitably, insurers will do so. It is a tautology that bears repeating
occasionally: insurers want to sell as much insurance as they profitably can. Or put
another way, there is no need to theorize about the efficacy of a proposed solution
to the affordability and availability crisis that rests upon insurer behavior that
insurers already can engage in. The market is its own test. If the solution works, then
insurers already are doing it. Insurers want to sell insurance.
Second, so long as insurers can have narrow, undistorted risk pools—in
other words, separately priced insurance arranged into population cohorts based on
levels of risk—“high risk” addresses will not have access to unsubsidized,
affordable insurance.47 Numerously populated and highly heterogeneous risk pools
result in lower premiums for (from an underwriting perspective) high-risk insureds
and result in higher premiums for (from an underwriting perspective) low-risk
insureds. Just as having affordable, available health insurance for historically
unhealthy persons requires a risk pool with high take-up rates by “young healthies,”
the affordability of hurricane insurance for Galveston, Texas will be advanced if:
(1) Galveston is pooled with Amarillo, Texas and (2) take-up rates in Amarillo are
high. But for this same reason, an insurer who does underwrite averaging hurricane
risk in Galveston with Amarillo cannot compete. Other insurers will disaggregate
Galveston and Amarillo addresses, thus selling to Amarillo cheaper, which will
leave the first insurer with no choice but either to stop selling hurricane insurance in
Galveston or dramatically raise the cost of insurance in Galveston.
Third, any government restructuring of insurance markets has embedded,
potentially controversial political-policy choices. Just as including contraception
within the mandated coverages of the Affordable Care Act may simultaneously
reflect sound public health policy and controversial political policy, so too will
choices about insuring catastrophe, such as mandating that hazard insurance cover
flood even though most homes are not in flood plains, reflect sound emergency
46.
See, e.g., Amy O’Connor, Florida’s Property Insurance Market Is ‘Spiraling
Towards Collapse’ Due to Litigation: Report, INS. J. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2021/01/20/598034.htm
[https://perma.cc/6F2CLWX2] (“As capital and surplus deteriorates, companies lose the flexibility to be able to write
additional business . . . that has consequences for the consumer.”); accord Tim Flanagan, Why
Are Insurers Leaving the ACA Marketplace and what does it mean for Obamacare?,
HEALTHCARE RECRUITERS INT’L (Oct. 25, 2016), https://hcrnetwork.com/insurers-leavingaca-marketplace-mean-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/7D9R-B4Y6] (“[A]ll three major
insurers said they are losing money on the plans”).
47.
See generally Risk Pooling: How Health Insurance in the Individual Market
Works, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES, https://www.actuary.org/content/risk-pooling-how-healthinsurance-individual-market-works-0 [https://perma.cc/5HDX-AV45] (last visited July 31,
2021) (describing the dynamics of distorted and undistorted risk pooling in the context of the
ACA); accord Issue Brief: Using High-Risk Pools to Cover High-Risk Enrollees, AM. ACAD.
ACTUARIES,
https://www.actuary.org/content/using-high-risk-pools-cover-high-riskenrollees [https://perma.cc/W6MC-WJQ9] (last visited July, 31, 2021).
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planning policy but controversial political policy. Just as it may be politically
controversial to mandate community pricing in health insurance that results in a
healthy 20-year-old individual paying for some of the risk of an 80-year-old cancer
patient, so too will it be politically controversial to price flood insurance so that
some part of the cost of insuring luxury vacation homes on the coast is shared by
homeowners insuring modest family homes far inland.
Any proposed solution to homeowner insurance affordability and
availability should either debunk or account for all three of these premises.

II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATELY INSURING U.S.
HOMES FOR CATASTROPHE
Any proposal to reform the U.S. markets for private homeowner insurance
must account for what insurance homeowners currently have and why they have it.
In the current private homeowner insurance market, most but far from all owneroccupied homes are required by a mortgage to carry insurance for catastrophe loss.
The vast majority of those insurance policies routinely exclude flood and earthquake
from covered peril. In broadest summary, roughly one-third of American
homeowners have a choice whether to insure for fire and wind, ninety percent or
more of homeowners have a choice whether to insure for flood, and essentially all
homeowners have a choice whether to insure for earthquake. Voluntary take-up rates
differ by peril. Understanding those differences is the foundation of remediating
them.
A. What Perils Are Insured
In the United States, homeowner insurance generally defines coverage for
catastrophe loss through the use of one of a handful of Insurance Services Office
(“ISO”) policy forms.48 The HO-3 Special Form “is the most commonly purchased
type of homeowner policy, accounting for 81.9% of all owner-occupied exposures
countrywide in 2012.”49 The HO-3 Special Form covers all perils except “flood,
earthquake, war, nuclear accident, intentional loss, collapse, mold, wear and tear,
seepage, settling, and other perils specifically excluded.”50 Put simply, standard
homeowner insurance covers fire and wind but not flood or earthquake.51

48.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 15––16.
49.
Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
50.
Id. at 17 (italics deleted from original).
51.
See, e.g., Cassandra Stephenson, Who Pays for Flood Damage? Most Middle
Tennesseans Don’t Have Flood Insurance., NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (Mar. 30, 2021, 1:52
PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2021/03/30/nashville-flood-most-standardinsurance-policies-dont-cover-floods/7051238002/
[https://perma.cc/X63A-SA8X]
(“Unfortunately, a lot of renters, a lot of homeowners assume that they are fully protected for
all losses, but flood is always a separate coverage — it's always a separate policy,’ Mark
Friedlander, spokesperson for the Insurance Information Institute, said . . . . ‘More than 95%
of homeowners in the greater Nashville area do not have flood coverage,’ Friedlander said.
Nationally, about 85% of U.S. homeowners are not protected against flood damage, though
about 90% of natural disasters in the country involve flooding.”). And things might one day
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There can be profound coverage implications to the coverage exclusion of
flood and earthquake. By its terms, standard hazard insurance typically will allow
an insured to opt for a coverage limit of the dwelling structure that describes the
estimated full reconstruction cost (plus endorsements to cover the cost of intervening
changes in building codes and possible post-disaster demand surge pricing), the loss
of personal property, damage to landscaping and other structures, and alternative
living expenses during the period the insured has lost the ability to live in the
dwelling.52 Put another way, if a home is lost due to a covered peril, then the basic
and intended design of a standard homeowner insurance with replacement coverage,
in broad strokes, promises to fund the replacement of the home, the replacement of
the stuff that was in the home, much of the cost of the replacement of things like
landscaping and fencing outside of the home, and the cost of the homeowner living
elsewhere while the home is being rebuilt.
Flood insurance policies are less generous by design. Virtually all flood
insurance is through the federal National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). In the
United States in 2018 there were 5,037,266 total NFIP policies (either directly
written or under a private insurer’s name) representing $1.327 trillion of insurance
in force, while by contrast the total of direct written premiums for all private insurers
that year was $540,875.53 NFIP coverage for the reconstruction of the dwelling is
capped at $250,000.54 Personal property loss also is covered and is capped at
$100,000.55 There is no coverage for building code changes,56 alternative living
expenses (the cost of the homeowner living elsewhere while the home is being
rebuilt), or landscaping losses (replacing the fences, trees, etc., outside of the
house).57

get even worse for the homeowner. In the summer of 2019, the Oregon Division of Financial
Regulation solicited input of the “recent trend[]” of “[s]ome homeowners’ . . . liability
filings” that contained proposed “exclusions for losses resulting from wildfires . . . . defined
broadly . . . .” E-mail from Alex Cheng, Senior Pol’y Analyst, Or. Dep’t of Consumer & Bus.
Servs., to Author (June 17, 5:08 PM) (on file with author). The ODFR has rejected the filings,
but that does not close the matter forever.
52.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 29.
53.
Facts + Statistics: Flood Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/factstatistic/facts-statistics-flood-insurance#Private%20Flood%20Insurance,%202016-2019
[https://perma.cc/22J6-5MAH] (last visited July 31, 2020). An exemplar of an NFIP policy
can be found at: https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual201205/content/15_policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CQM6-ZDVK].
54.
National Flood Insurance Program Answers to Questions About the
NFIP, FEMA 4 (Dec. 2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/f084_atq_
11aug11.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2NE-NDEX].
55.
Id.
56.
Reconstruction beyond the home as it was built, where building codes
have changed since the original construction and so now, to be code compliant, a different
house needs to be built.
57.
National Flood Insurance Plan Summary of Coverage, FEMA 4–5 (Aug.
2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_nfip-summary-coverage_jul
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8J9-DYP3].
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Earthquake insurance, at least in California, is not less generous than
standard hazard insurance, but it is a lot more expensive. It is difficult to know what
percentage of earthquake insurance is private insurance or what that private
insurance looks like nationally, but in California, almost all earthquake insurance is
through public insurance programs such as the California Earthquake Authority.58
Earthquake coverages look very much like those of a standard hazard homeowner
policy but with higher premiums and higher deductibles.59
There is wide variability of voluntary take-up rates between flood and
earthquake insurance, on the one hand, and standard hazard insurance, on the other
hand. Ideally, there would be broad take-up of flood insurance, because flooding is
“the most common, destructive, and costly form of natural catastrophe in the United
States.”60 In 2019, the aggregate estimated reconstruction costs of single-family
residential homes at risk from storm surge in Gulf and Atlantic states totaled about
$1.8 trillion.61 Through 2019, eight of the ten costliest disasters on record have been
hurricanes, with the other two being the September 11 terrorist attacks (not a natural
disaster) and the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake.62 According to the
Insurance Information Institute (“I.I.I.”):
Insured losses from hurricanes rose in the past 15 years as hurricane
activity has intensified. When adjusted for inflation and after losses
are tallied for the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes, nine of the 10 costliest
hurricanes in U.S. history have struck since 2004. In addition to the
increase in storm activity, construction along both the Gulf Coast and
East Coast has continued to develop, and property values have
increased, resulting in higher loss exposure.63

Yet as of 2019, only 10–14% of owner-occupied homes in the United States
were insured for flood.64 And 40% of owner-occupied homes insured for flood are
required to have flood insurance,65 meaning less than 10% of owner-occupied homes
are explicitly, voluntarily insuring for floods.

58.
Earthquake Insurance, CAL. DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01consumers/105-type/95-guides/03-res/eq-ins.cfm#basicearthquake [https://perma.cc/7Z7CYJ68] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (“The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) provides
most earthquake insurance in California.”).
59.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 38–40. See generally CAL.
EARTHQUAKE AUTH., https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/ [https://perma.cc/5CQ6-4468]
(last visited July 31, 2021) (showing that earthquake insurance looks very much like a
standard hazard homeowner policy).
60.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 27.
61.
2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 101.
62.
Id. at 146.
63.
Id. at 147.
64.
Facts + Statistics: Flood Insurance, supra note 53; Homeowners Insurance:
Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, supra note 22, at 5.
65.
See Sarah Strochak et al., Too Many Homeowners Lack Flood Insurance, but
Many Buy It Voluntarily, URB. INST. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/too-
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While it is unknown precisely what percentage of homeowners required to
have flood insurance would have voluntarily insured otherwise, adverse selection
theorists would predict the answer to be “lots.” The facts on the ground belie this
prediction. Outside of Special Flood Hazard Areas (areas where flood insurance is
required to get a federally backed mortgage), “very few properties have a flood
policy, even in areas at risk of flooding.”66 Even after a major flood, voluntary takeup rates of flood insurance typically only increase by 1.5%.67 All of this suggests
that voluntary take-up rates of flood insurance probably run slightly less than 10%.
Earthquake insurance rarely is mandated.68 The CEO of the California
Earthquake Authority is quoted as saying only 10% of Californians have earthquake
insurance.69 Nationally the figure is 7%–8%.70 When Mary Kelly, Steven Bowen,
and Glenn McGillivray studied why take-up rates of earthquake insurance are so
dismal (in the United States, in contrast to Canada), they concluded that the likely
explanation was something unique to the American psyche and attitudes about
freedom and government.71
However, standard hazard homeowner insurance is a horse of a different
color. In broadest terms, more than 90% of American homeowners have basic
homeowner hazard insurance. The public-facing data of the I.I.I. reports that 95%
of owner-occupied homes have homeowner insurance.72 Marian Sassian, I.I.I.’s
Research Director, reports that in the fall of 2018, 91% of homeowners said they
had homeowner insurance, down slightly from 93% in 2016 and trending down since
2011 when the figure was 97%.73

many-homeowners-lack-flood-insurance-many-buy-it-voluntarily [https://perma.cc/6JXTBT94] (citing 2017 American Housing Survey Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/ahs.html
[https://perma.cc/Z5R3R4M3]) (“Nationally, 40 percent of those who have flood insurance purchased it because it
was required and 60 percent purchased it voluntarily.”).
66.
Carolyn Kousky et al., Flood Risk and the U.S. Housing Market, 29 J. HOUS.
RSCH. S3, S9 (2020).
67.
Id. at S10–11; see Craig E. Landry et al., Willingness to Pay for Multi-Peril
Hazard Insurance 21 (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3662668.
68.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 38 (citation omitted).
69.
Nick Miller, Only 10 Percent of California Homes Are Covered By
Earthquake Insurance, EMPIRE KVCR (July 9, 2019 11:49 AM), https://www.kvcrnews.
org/post/only-10-percent-california-homes-are-covered-earthquake-insurance#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/X4B3-NHEU].
70.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 39 fig.9; Homeowners Insurance:
Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, supra note 22, at 6.
71.
Mary Kelly et al., The Earthquake Insurance Protection Gap: A Tale of Two
Countries, 39 J. INS. REG. 1, 22, 28 (2020).
72.
Claire, How Many Homes are Insured? How Many are Uninsured?, INS. INFO.
INST.: TRIPLE-I BLOG (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/how-manyhomes-are-insured-how-many-are-uninsured/ [https://perma.cc/K5PN-JL4E].
73.
E-mail from Maria Sassian, Research Dir., Ins. Info. Inst., to Author (May 29,
2020, 9:58 AM) (on file with author).
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B. Theories of Variable Voluntary Take-Up Rates of Insured Perils
The common explanation for the dramatically higher take-up rates of
standard hazard insurance is that Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) compliant mortgages
require standard homeowner insurance.74 But from 2011–2018, only 59%–66% of
homes had a mortgage or line of credit (averaging 63% without a steady trend
equivalent to that of I.I.I. calculations of take-up rates of standard hazard
insurance).75 In other words, while it appears that, given the choice, only 9%–10%
of U.S. homeowners choose to have flood insurance and only 7%–8% of U.S.
homeowners choose to have earthquake insurance, 73.5%–87.8% of U.S.
homeowners choose to have standard hazard insurance.
Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for this differential in take-up rates
is that for most American homeowners, flood and earthquake insurance seems an
over-priced product protecting against an unlikely to occur risk. Or put in the jargon
of an economist, the differential in take-up rates is the result of self-selecting
behaviors by homeowners based on either their perceived risk of incurring the peril
(adverse selection76) or their interest in buying insurance waning quickly as price
increases (price elasticity77).
The template to study this intuitive explanation is the NFIP. While adverse
selection behaviors cannot exist when flood insurance is required (some mortgages
require a home to have flood insurance), flood insurance remains relatively
expensive, and voluntary take-up rates are consistent with adverse selection
behaviors.78 Kunreuther summarizes the problem:
On the demand side empirical evidence reveals why homeowners
have been reluctant to protect themselves against low probabilityhigh consequence events, such as natural disasters, unless they are
required to do so. On the supply side there are clear reasons why
the insurance industry has been reluctant to actively promote this
74.
See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market
Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 345, 351 (2011).
75.
American Housing Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=2011
&s_tablename=TABLE14A&s_bygroup1=19&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=2&s_filtergr
oup2=1 (last visited July 31, 2021) (click “Get Table” to generate table for 2011; to generate
table for 2013, choose 2013 in “Select Year” dropdown menu and click “Get Table;” repeat
for 2015 and 2017).
76.
See, e.g., Paul Hudson et al., Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Natural
Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States, 93
LAND ECON. 179, 179–80 (2017).
77.
See, e.g., Ajita Atreya et al., What Drives Households to Buy Flood Insurance?
New Evidence from Georgia, 117 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 140 (2015).
78.
See Flood Insurance Coverage of Federal Housing Administration SingleFamily Homes, HUD v–vii, 20–27, 40 (March 30, 2020) (stating that homes not in a Special
Flood Hazard Area are less likely to have flood insurance; homes within 600 meters of SFHA
had insurance take-up rates more similar to homes further away rather than homes within
SFHA).
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type of coverage [volume of likely business is low, volume of new
business is very low, and most acquired business is self-selected
for risk].79
In a similar vein, the Federal Insurance Office of the U.S. Department of
the Treasury (“FIO”) finds: “The location of the NFIP-insured property is among
the most important underwriting factors affecting the premium charged.”80 The FIO
further describes:
Homeowner insurers manage exposures to natural catastrophe
risks in a variety of ways. One strategy used by insurers is to
decrease exposure to risk of loss in areas that are subject to natural
catastrophes. Insurers decrease exposure to the risk of loss by
imposing moratoria on any new business in certain geographic
markets or by exiting a market completely. For example, in 2009,
one insurer ceased writing new business in Florida and in the same
year non-renewed 11,000 homeowner insurance policies in five
coastal counties located in Texas. In 2011, another insurer
announced that it was exiting the Florida market due to the risk of
natural catastrophes. The ease with which insurers can enter and
exit a market varies by state. For example, some states require
notice regarding an insurer’s withdrawal to be given to the state
insurance regulator 180 days prior to the withdrawal.
Insurers also respond to increased risk in the homeowner
insurance market through coverage exclusions and special
deductibles. For example, most homeowner insurance policies
exclude losses associated with earthquakes and flooding. In
addition, although included in homeowner insurance policy
provisions since the 1990s, concurrent causation clauses have
been the subject of much debate following both Hurricane Katrina
and Superstorm Sandy. At times, a covered peril (such as wind)
may combine with an excluded peril (such as earth movement) to
cause damage to a home; this is referred to as concurrent
causation. Unless prohibited by state law, an insurer typically
includes anti-concurrent causation clauses in homeowner
insurance policies to limit the insurer’s liability for losses caused
by excluded perils.81

79.
Howard Kunreuther, Causes of Underinsurance Against Natural Disasters, 9
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 206, 219 (1984); see also Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly,
Neglecting Disaster: Why People Don’t Insure Against Large Losses, 28 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2004). But see Celine Grislain-Letrémy, Natural Disasters: Exposure and
Underinsurance, 129 ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 53, 53 (2018).
80.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 31.
81.
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted).
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The bottom line is that for low take-up perils insurance—flood and
earthquake —the cost is high, and the coverage may be inadequate (for example, the
NFIP caps available coverage at $250,00082).
Further, forcing insurers to write coverage for high-risk insureds is no
solution. The way public insurance can fail as a cost-control or availability
mechanism is dramatically illustrated by the experience of auto insurance in New
Jersey in the 1980s, as described by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. State.83 For many years, New Jersey “faced an
intractable problem of providing coverage for high-risk drivers.”84 In 1983, the State
passed a law requiring all insurers writing auto coverage in the State to write for
high-risk drivers too in a pool called the Joint Underwriting Association (“JUA”),
and JUA insurance had to be priced at the same price as for the general population.85
The idea was that the general population of drivers would partially subsidize highrisk drivers, with the rest of the cost being covered by the State.86 The result: “by
1988 over 50% of New Jersey drivers had to be insured by the JUA . . . . [and] the
JUA . . . accumulated a deficit of over $3.3 billion in unpaid claims and other
losses.”87 Trying to force insurers to insure just is not good for anyone.
That said, it of course bears noting that homeowners are not reluctant to
insure against hazards generally—at least 75% voluntarily do so. In other words,
behavior in standard hazard insurance belies the explanation of adverse selection
(or, for that matter, moral hazard).88
What about price elasticity? The data belie this as well.89 Once a
homeowner has decided to buy, there is evidence that the homeowner will seek to
fully insure. Collier and Ragin find that of homeowners who had the option to fully
insure, under-insure, or over-insure, 79.55% of homeowners are either fully insured
or over-insured.90 I.I.I. surveys find, “most policyholders do not comparison shop
for homeowner[s] insurance when it’s time to renew their policy.”91
In the end, there may be a variety of explanations for the high voluntary
take-up rates of standard homeowner insurance. Perhaps homeowners who once
were forced to buy standard hazard insurance continue to do so when the mandate
is removed. Data from the most recent American Housing Survey of the U.S. Census
82.
National Flood Insurance Program Answers to Questions About the NFIP,
supra note 54, at 4.
83.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991).
84.
Id. at 195.
85.
Id. at 195–96.
86.
Id. at 196.
87.
Id.
88.
Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
89.
Atreya et al., supra note 77.
90.
See Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, The Influence of Sellers on
Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance, WHARTON 12, tbl.3 (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CollierRagin_Influenceof-Sellers-on-NFIP-contract-choice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVH9-AM2X].
91.
Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices,
supra note 22, at 13.

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

697

Bureau suggest that as of 2017, only 8.5% of owner-occupied homes were purchased
outright, suggesting 91.5% of homes initially were purchased with some sort of
mortgage.92 That is a remarkably similar number to total take-up rates of standard
hazard insurance. One might call this a sort of “Netflix effect”—people pay for the
service long after they stop watching the shows.93 Or perhaps having purchased
insurance for many years, homeowners simply see it as a good buy. Misperception
may be another explanation for the contrasting voluntary take-up rates of standard
hazard insurance and flood and earthquake insurance. Survey data indicate that
“43% of homeowners incorrectly believe damage from heavy rain flooding is
covered under their standard insurance policy,” 28% think hurricane storm surge is
covered, and 29% think earthquake is covered.94 But consistent with the “Netflix
effect” explanation is that “many landlords do require their tenants to purchase
renters insurance,” and while the requirement is “not consistently mandated” and is
“banned or limited in some states and cities,” the take-up rates of renters insurance
steadily rose from 29% in 2011 to 57% in 2020.95
Whatever the explanation, it is patent that roughly two-thirds of U.S.
homeowners are required to have basic hazard insurance, and three-quarters or more
of the rest choose to buy it.

III. HINTS OF A SOLUTION
The experience of current insurers in the wake of natural disaster gives
hints of a solution.
Catastrophes are so-called “fat-tailed” events (the most likely version of
the event is the least costly, and the least likely is the most costly) involving
“correlated losses” (when the really bad version happens, it happens to many people
all at once) making them difficult to insure (meaning hard to price in a way that
makes the price attractive in a non-event year and yet builds sufficient capital to
adequately insure in an event year).96 Think of it this way: given the unlikelihood
92.
American Housing Survey (AHS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=
2017&s_tablename=TABLE13&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filter
group2=1 (last visited July 31, 2021) (click “Get Table”).
93.
If there is a Netflix-like indoctrination effect going on, then there are no data
on what percentage of homeowners would have voluntarily purchased homeowner insurance
in the absence of this form of indoctrination. The answer perhaps would look like the
experience of earthquake and flood insurance: 7%–10%. But since over 90% of first-time
homebuyers do have a mortgage, this is purely hypothetical, counter-narrative speculation.
94.
Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices,
supra note 22, at 2, 6, 9.
95.
Id. at 4; 2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, INS. INFO. INST. 11 (Sept. 2020),
https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/2020_triple-i_consumer_poll_091620.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9ZX-3RYM].
96.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Tristan Nguyen,
Insurability of Catastrophe Risks and Government Participation in Insurance Solutions,
PREVENTIONWEB (2013), http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/en/bgdocs/
Nguyen,%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJP7-JP3A]; Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of
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that a storm of sufficient magnitude ever will destroy any particular Jacksonville,
Florida, semi-inland home, a Jacksonville homeowner who doesn’t live quite close
to the water might only voluntarily buy flood insurance if it was cheap. But given
that the insurer knows that in the unlikely event such a storm occurs that it could
destroy hundreds of semi-inland Jacksonville homes all at once, the insurance
cannot profitably be priced cheaply.97
The challenge is illustrated by the 2011 work of Kunreuther, MichelKerjan, and Ranger, who explored “the potential implications of climate change for
the availability and affordability of insurance in the world’s largest insurance
market, the USA, focusing on wind-related property insurance in Florida.”98 They
found:
[T]he total price of insurance for Florida (assuming constant
exposure) could increase significantly by 2040, from $12.9 billion
(in 1990) to $14.2 billion, under hard market conditions. Under
the lower bound projection, premiums could decline to $9.4
billion by 2040. Taking a broader range of climate change
scenarios, prices could be between $4.7 and $32.1 billion by 2040.
The upper end of this range could suggest that insurance becomes
unaffordable for many people in Florida. Adaptation significantly
reduces losses and premiums under all scenarios and extends the
amount of coverage that could be provided by the private
insurance market. The implementation of loss reduction measures
and provision of reinsurance against catastrophic losses can
increase the availability of insurance in Florida and make it more
affordable to residents of the state even under a high loss climate
change scenario.99
Price also can be driven down by diverse, populated, and undistorted risk pools. In
some communities, for example, an effective response to the high cost of flood
insurance has been to have community rating models (requiring insurance providers
to offer insurance policies within a given territory at the same price without regard
to otherwise differentiating underwriting factors) trigger more aggressive riskspreading; this model results in price reductions greater than 40%.100

Natural Catastrophes: The Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, RES. FOR
FUTURE 2 (Sept. 22, 2010), https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/managing-therisk-of-natural-catastrophes-the-role-and-functioning-of-state-insurance-programs/ [https://
perma.cc/HMZ2-KXLH]).
97.
See generally French, supra note 6, at 831–32 (and sources cited therein).
98.
Howard Kunreuther et al., Insuring Climate Catastrophes in Florida: An
Analysis of Insurance Pricing and Capacity under Various Scenarios of Climate Change and
Adaption Measures, RESEARCHGATE 2 (July 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/228536886_Insuring_climate_catastrophes_in_Florida_an_analysis_of_insuran
ce_pricing_and_capacity_under_various_scenarios_of_climate_change_and_adaptation_me
asures.
99.
Id. at 14–15.
100.
Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 33.
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But in a competitive market without the requirement of community pricing,
homeowners will be driven into public or quasi-public products of last resort. Even
in populous California, policies such as the California Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements (“FAIR”) Plan101 increasingly are the only available fire insurance for
homeowners in high-risk areas.102
What does this mean? The CDI estimates 3.6 million California homes are
in the wildland-urban interface.103 Zillow estimates that nearly half a million homes
in California are at high or very high fire risk.104 CoreLogic notes 400,000 homes at
extreme fire risk just in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego,
Sacramento, and San Francisco.105 I.I.I. and Verisk Analytics put that number at
greater than two million homes statewide.106 By any measure that’s a lot of homes,
and homeowners are finding that, in the markets as currently structured, private
homeowner insurance is or soon will be unavailable or unaffordable.
Kunreuther argues that private insurers should have an interest in
promoting an all-hazards policy.107 Kunreuther argues that all-hazards coverage (or
what is referred to in this Article as All Perils) avoids post-event litigation over
whether the cause of loss is covered or excluded, and all-hazards coverage results in
risk “diversified across hazards and thus reduces the variance of losses via the law
of large numbers.”108 It is unclear whether, in the insurance markets as currently
structured, private insurers lack enthusiasm for selling all-hazards policies,
homeowners lack enthusiasm for buying all-hazards policies, or both. What is clear
is that all-hazards insurance is not prevalent in the market.109 Consequently,
government has had to step into the breach with FAIR Plans, the NFIP, and the

101.
Insurance of last resort for homeowners who cannot find fire insurance for
their dwelling. See About FAIR Plan, CAL. FAIR PLAN PROP. INS., https://www.
cfpnet.com/about-fair-plan/ [https://perma.cc/WHT3-M5Q2] (last visited July 31, 2021).
102.
Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability,
supra note 31.
103.
The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 1.
104.
Sydney Price, Nearly 500,000 California Homes at High or Very High Fire
Risk, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0726/nearly-500-000-california-homes-at-high-or-very-high-fire-risk.
105.
2019 CoreLogic Wildfire Risk Report Highlights U.S. Wildfire Vulnerability,
Finding Nearly 776,000 Homes at Extreme Risk of Wildfire Damage this Year, CORELOGIC
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.corelogic.com/news/2019-corelogic-wildfire-risk-reporthighlights-us-wildfire-vulnerability-finding-nearly-776000-homes-at-extreme-risk-ofwildfire.aspx [https://perma.cc/W8KB-DWU5].
106.
More Than 2 Million California Homes Exposed to High Wildfire Danger,
AER
(2012),
https://www.aer.com/news-events/press-releases/2012/more-2-millioncalifornia-homes-exposed-high-wildfire-danger/ [https://perma.cc/NK8T-F9GR].
107.
Kunreuther, supra note 37 (citing HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL.,
INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST
MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 20–23 (2013)).
108.
Id.
109.
See Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for
Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 3–4, 15–48.
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like.110 These products become exemplars of the challenges of insuring fat-tailed,
correlated-loss risks. The products have high prices and low take-up rates,111 and
therefore fail to realize the price efficiencies (risk-spreading) only available if
insurance is ubiquitous among a broad, undistorted risk pool. “[E]ither because of
political pressure [public, last resort insurance products] are actuarially unsound and
end up creating a continuing liability to governments, or in failing to price individual
risks correctly they encourage property development in risky locations . . . .”112
The clearest route to an affordable price is community rating of “all perils”
insurance. “By bundling hazards in a single policy, property owners are likely to
perceive the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase coverage
prior to experiencing a disaster.”113 Conversely, non-renewal frequency in the wake
of mass loss events indicates the mechanics and incentives of geographic and risk
segmentation.114 This all suggests that a solution would be public All Perils
insurance, if it were both politically and actuarially possible (it apparently is not),115
or otherwise restructuring private markets to promote something akin to community
pricing in health insurance.116
But this solution only works if an insurer can sell it, which an insurer cannot
do so long as the insurer will be price-cut by its competitors.

IV. EXTANT PROPOSALS TO MAKE HOMEOWNER INSURANCE FOR
NATURAL CATASTROPHES AFFORDABLE AND AVAILABLE
A. California’s Proposal for Legislative Reform of Homeowner Insurers and
Ratemaking
In 2018, the CDI published The Availability and Affordability of Coverage
for Wildfire Loss in Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface

110.
Id.
111.
See, e.g., Andrew Blankstein & Monica Alba, Why Do So Few California
Homeowners Have Earthquake Insurance?, NBC (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:28 AM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/investigations/why-do-so-few-california-homeowners-have-earthquakeinsurance-n227711#:~:text=Premiums%20for%20earthquake%20insurance%20range,the%
20counties%20most%20at%20risk [https://perma.cc/39ZR-M9WK]; Mark Andrew Boyer,
Is Earthquake Insurance Worth the Cost?, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS (June 14, 2010), https://
uphelp.org/is-earthquake-insurance-worth-the-cost/ [https://perma.cc/CUP2-AFZ8]; Les
Christie, 3 Reasons Why Californians Shun Quake Insurance, CNN (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:35
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/08/25/pf/insurance/earthquake-insurance-cost/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5DZJ-P3W4].
112.
John McAneney et al., Government-Sponsored Natural Disaster Insurance
Pools: A View from Down-Under, 15 INT’L. J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 1, 7 (2016); see
also Justin R. Pidot, Coastal Disaster Insurance in the Era of Global Warming: The Case for
Relying on the Private Market, SSRN 1 (Apr. 28. 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695697.
113.
Kunreuther, supra note 37.
114.
Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability,
supra note 31.
115.
See generally John McAneney et al., supra note 112, at 4–5.
116.
See generally French, supra note 6, at 833 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548 (2012)).
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and Other High-Risk Areas of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions.117
The proposal outlined “legislative concepts” the CDI believed were “necessary” to
address the issues of affordability and availability.118
To address availability, the CDI proposed that any insurer wishing to offer
homeowner insurance anywhere in California must either also offer it in high firerisk areas to homes that meet specified mitigation protocols or offer supplemental
insurance to the California FAIR Plan to add the coverages the FAIR Plan lacks:
An insurer admitted to transact fire insurance would agree to offer,
issue, or renew a “policy of residential property insurance” for
reasons relating to the risk of fire loss on property located within
“state responsibility areas,” . . . if the property meets specific
mitigation and defensible-space criteria and any other underwriting
guidelines relating to the peril of fire that have a substantial
relationship to the risk of fire loss, which guidelines would be
approved by the Insurance Commissioner . . . . An insurer admitted
to transact fire insurance may refuse to offer, issue, or renew a “policy
of residential property insurance” for reasons relating to the risk of
fire loss on property located within “state responsibility areas,” . . . if
the insurer instead offers the applicant or insured a “difference in
conditions” insurance policy and/or a “premises liability” insurance
policy . . . . A “premises liability” policy is one that covers bodily
injury and property damage suffered by others in connection with the
property, including personal liability coverage and medical-payment
coverage. The premises-liability policy offered by the insurer must be
at least as broad as the liability portion of coverage offered by that
insurer under its homeowners’ insurance coverage.119

In order to reduce the frequency of an insurer declining to renew coverage
or dramatically increasing premiums in order to renew, the CDI proposed a process
for homeowners to appeal and get the CDI involved in an insurer’s underwriting
decisions.120
Finally, to address affordability, the CDI proposed three reforms. First, the
CDI proposed premium subsidies from the State: “A property insured under a policy
of residential property insurance is eligible for a premium credit, as compared to
other similarly situated properties, if the property meets specific mitigation and
defensible-space criteria, as described above, for offering, issuing, and renewing
homeowners’ insurance coverage.”121
Second, the CDI proposed disallowing most disaster modeling in rate
filings:

117.
The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17.
118.
Id. at 6.
119.
Id. at 7.
120.
Id. at 10–11.
121.
Id. at 8.

702

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63:1

Insurers will be permitted to use a “wildfire-risk model” (to determine
eligibility for, or the premium of, a policy of residential property
insurance) only if it has been filed with and approved by the Insurance
Commissioner. Under this proposal, a “wildfire-risk model” is
defined as any computer-based, map-based, or other measurement or
simulation tool used by an insurer to rate, underwrite, or otherwise
assess or evaluate the risk of wildfire and/or consequence of wildfire
to residential structures. The Insurance Commissioner shall not
approve a wildfire-risk model used by an insurer to determine
eligibility for, or the premium of, a policy of residential property
insurance unless the model takes into account the amount and density
of fuel surrounding the structure, slope and slope aspect (direction)
of the property, accessibility to the property by emergency
responders, and any community-level or property-level mitigation
efforts, if that data is provided by state or local fire officials or is
otherwise available to the insurer by way of an inspection of the
property.122

Third, the CDI proposed aggregating data to have more accurate risk
ratemaking:
CDI will be granted authority to obtain data from insurers in order to
examine the aggregated California premium-and-loss data by wildfire
risk (e.g., the data used by CALFIRE’s model) to create a wildfireexposure-risk manual similar in concept to the frequency and severity
bands manual used by auto insurers in developing private passenger
auto rates. Insurers could rely on the aggregated wildfire-exposurerisk data to develop credible wildfire-risk rates that would allow them
to more accurately price the few risks currently being written as well
as loosen their current underwriting restrictions and write more risks
that are currently being turned down for coverage.123

In February of 2020, the CDI proposed and argued for legislation to
increase the prevalence of “fire-hardened” communities.124 The bill faced fierce
industry opposition and died in committee.125 That same year, the California
Insurance Commissioner vowed to pursue the same initiative by regulation.126 In
February of 2021, the Commissioner and the Governor of California announced an
initiative to do so.127

122.
Id. at 10.
123.
Id. at 12.
124.
Act of Feb. 18, 2020, No. 2367, 2019–2020 Cal. Legisl.
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2367
[https://perma.cc/U2BP-BPQ6] (adding Section 2063 and Article 9 (commencing with
Section 13575) to Chapter 2, Division 3 of the Insurance Code).
125.
Id.; Bikales, supra note 37.
126.
See Bikales, supra note 37.
127.
Commissioner Lara and Governor Newsom’s Administration to Establish
Home and Community Hardening Standards for Insurance, CAL. DEP’T INS. (Feb. 8, 2021)
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2021/releaseXXX-2021.cfm
[https://perma.cc/XKZ2-J8GH].
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B. Professor Kunreuther’s Proposal for Private, All-Perils Homeowner Insurance
In 2018, Professor Howard Kunreuther—arguably the most important and
prolific academic writer on insurance and natural disaster—proposed solving
affordability and availability through a regulatory restructuring by states to require
the sale of All Perils insurance, or, put another way, to prohibit homeowner hazard
insurance that excluded perils such as flood and earthquake.128
Kunreuther starts from two premises: “Premiums should reflect risk” and
“any special treatment given to low-income individuals currently residing in hazardprone areas should come from general public funding and not through insurance
premium subsidies.”129
Kunreuther then proposes a multi-pronged solution. Kunreuther proposes
that “policymakers should consider requiring catastrophic coverage for all
individuals who face risk.”130 He proposes “risk-based insurance premiums
. . . coupled with building codes so that those residing in hazard-prone areas adopt
cost-effective loss-reduction measures.”131 He contemplates “property improvement
loans” and multi-year insurance contracts “of 3–5 years with backup from the public
sector on catastrophic losses.”132 He envisions “means-tested vouchers or tax-credits
via the public sector to those who undertook cost-effective mitigation measures.”133
Finally, he argues for state reinsurance facilities to the extent that the private sector
does not fulfill this role.134
Kunreuther asserts: “If insurers were permitted to charge risk-based
premiums, they would very likely want to market coverage against earthquakes and
floods as long as they were protected against catastrophic losses.”135 And he argues
that “by bundling hazards into a single policy, property owners are likely to perceive
the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase coverage prior to
experiencing a disaster.”136
C. Professor French’s Proposal for Public, All-Perils Homeowner Insurance
Professor Christopher French’s work is more of a departure from current
market structures than that of the CDI or Kunreuther. French describes how
earthquakes and floods are correlated risks, and so have long been excluded from
traditional hazard insurance of flood and earthquake as too dangerous to insurer
solvency.137 French also describes how wildfire, as distinct from “regular” fire,
behaves as a correlated risk too expensive to insure.138 French explains how the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Kunreuther, supra note 37; accord Mary Kelly et al., supra note 71, at 26.
Kunreuther, supra note 37.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 152.
See id. at 149, 152.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 143.
See French, supra note 6, at 824–25.
Id.

704

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63:1

solution is All Perils insurance sold in large, undistorted risk pools.139 French further
explains why he and other scholars believe insurance should be thought of “as
something more akin to a public financial instrument than a traditional contract
between private parties,” and thus “[p]rivate insurers should not be allowed to refuse
to insure existing high-risk properties in the absence of an alternative insurance
option.”140 But recognizing that private insurers will never be forced to affordably
insure high-risk properties,141 French proposes an alternative insurance option.142
That proposal is: “bundling coverages for numerous types of natural catastrophe
perils together in a single policy sold by the [federal] government . . . .”143
Simply put, French recognizes the fundamental failing of public insurance
of last resort—it is the “last resort” aspect. Last resort insurance is insurance of highrisk insureds, and in order to be actuarially sound, it must price as a high-risk pool.
Politicians are given a Hobson’s Choice: either offer actuarially unsound insurance
or price their own constituents out of the market.
French solves this problem by eliminating any avenue for low-risk insureds
to get private standard hazard insurance, and so he eliminates the “last resort”
structure, thus driving down the price. While he is not explicit about whether he is
proposing nationalized insurance or a public option, he must be proposing the former
because currently public All Perils insurance as an option could not compete with
private insurance as currently sold. In all but high-risk areas where private insurers
refuse to offer coverage, private insurers would parse out risk and offer cheaper
insurance for covered perils. So, one has to understand French’s proposal as
envisioning that private insurers will be out of the homeowner insurance business.

V. CONCERNS WITH THE EXTANT PROPOSALS
A. CDI’s Approach
The CDI’s proposal is provocative in its philosophical structure—it
essentially imposes the rule that an insurer who wants to offer insurance anywhere
in California has to offer it everywhere (assuming the home or community has taken
appropriate mitigation measures). Under the proposal, an insurer who wishes to sell
insurance anywhere has to commit to sell it in all high-risk communities.144 So,
unless an insurer wishes to write only high-risk insurance, the insurer presumably
will try to capture as much non-high-risk business as possible. The idea is innovative
and sound. California is the most populous state in the United States. The industry
as a whole is not going to abandon the states entirely.
But the CDI’s solution to availability is a bit illusory as a means of
promoting private hazard insurance for the rebuilding of a dwelling post-fire,
because a private insurer wishing to do business in California is not required to write
139.
See id. at 821–22.
140.
Id. at 846.
141.
See id. at 847.
142.
See id. at 847–58.
143.
Id. at 821–22.
144.
See The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in
Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas
of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 7.
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dwelling coverage in a high-risk community. Rather, an insurer is required either to
offer dwelling coverage or write supplemental coverage to public FAIR Plan
dwelling coverage.145 This will solve availability but will do nothing for
affordability. Because an insurer will not have to compete on price and there will
not be a requirement of undistorted risk pools (risk-spreading), the insurers do not
have an incentive to reduce price.
The CDI’s approach to affordability rests on an assumption that, with
proper mitigation, even homes in otherwise high-risk places will be affordably
insurable.146 Thus, except for some low-income homeowners (who will receive
premium subsidies), property with appropriate mitigation measures will, if properly
underwritten, have an affordable premium.
All observable evidence suggests that mitigation alone does not resolve
unaffordability. First, if there are mitigation measures at a community level that
substantially change risk profiles and thus drive down insurance costs, then one
would expect communities already do them. For some communities, of course, this
sort of comprehensive mitigation is either unaffordable or not cost-justified. But if
that is the case for all communities, then mitigation as a cost-control measure is
either not feasible or not reasonable. Or, put another way, if by aggressively
mitigating risk a community could change its risk profile from high-risk to low-risk
and thus make insurance broadly available and affordable in that community without
unacceptable consequences to the environment and other concerns, then of course a
community would do that.147 Communities ubiquitously would have done so. There
either wouldn’t be high-insurance cost communities at all or there wouldn’t be
enough such communities to be characterized as a state-wide crisis. A statewide
unaffordability crisis would not exist. Legislative reform would not be necessary.
This is not to say that state-encouraged or even state-required communityor home-specific mitigation is a bad idea. Community and individual home
145.
See id.
146.
See id. at 8 (“Homeowners have filed a significant number of complaints
alleging that their insurer has increased their premiums due to the real or perceived wildfire
risk. . . . CDI believes there are legislative changes that can be enacted to lessen the severity
of these high-premium increases. . . . A property insured under a policy of residential property
insurance is eligible for a premium credit, as compared to other similarly situated properties,
if the property meets specific mitigation and defensible-space criteria, as described above, for
offering, issuing, and renewing homeowners’ insurance coverage.”).
147.
See Howard Kunreuther et al., Risk Analysis for Extreme Events: Economic
Incentives for Reducing Future Losses, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 49–66 (Oct. 2004),
https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=100961
[https://perma.cc/Y7X57WFR] (discussing when it is cost effective for homeowners or communities to adopt
voluntary mitigation measures, accounting for all factors including the wealth of the
homeowner and the savings in insurance premiums); accord Andrew S. Natsios, Economic
Incentives and Disaster Mitigation, CIDBIMENA, http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/pdf/eng/
doc4729/doc4729-contenido.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN2H-YQMT] (last visited Aug 2, 2021)
(“Policymakers can probably change social behaviors more effectively through market
incentives than by threatening punishment for failure to comply with rules.”). It is, of course,
possible to require a community to cut down all the trees and shrubs within a mile of the
community, pave over every surface, and build all structures out of concrete. But that is not
going to happen.
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mitigation can and does help.148 But it is not a magic bullet to resolve affordability
in high-risk areas.149 Homeowners in high-risk communities will still pay for
insurance priced on the basis that they live in high-risk communities. And that
insurance will be priced as a high-risk pool of insureds.150
And homeowners cannot (or will not) solve that problem by mitigating at
a homeowner level. Nothing prevents homeowners right now from voluntarily firehardening their home to realize a lower price of insurance. Only 24% of
homeowners say they are likely to take action to protect their homes if it would
lower the premiums on their insurance.151 This suggests that homeowners do not
perceive the cost of mitigation to be worth the savings in insurance premiums.
Unless a state intervenes, there is absolutely nothing that prevents an insurer right
now from requiring mitigation as a condition of insurance. Again, if the cost of
mitigation was perceived by homeowners as affordable, and if that in turn was a
sufficient basis to drive price from current levels to affordable levels, then insurers
already would require mitigation as a means of capturing business.
This is not simply a consumer-education issue. Insurers and regulators
think deeply about how to better educate consumers about mitigation and promoting

148.
See, e.g., Mitigation Matters – and Hurricane Sally Proved It, INS. INFO. INST.:
RESILIENCE
BLOG
(Oct.
19,
2020),
https://resilience.iii.org/resilienceblog/hurricanes/mitigation-matters-and-hurricane-sally-proved-it/?utm_source=I.I.I.+Daily
+Newsletter&utm_campaign=f6b9df9f0f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_09_28_02_24_
COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_092139a76a-f6b9df9f0f-122627950 [https://
perma.cc/4XXG-THQS]; Dale Kasler & Phillip Reese, ‘The Weakest Link’: Why Your House
May Burn While Your Neighbor’s Survives the Next Wildfire, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 11,
2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article227665284.html; Joseph Serna,
Want to Fireproof Your Home? It Takes a Village, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2019-10-03/wildfire-defense-fire-proof-homehardening-sprinklers [https://perma.cc/2FGA-HY6U].
149.
See, e.g., Bikales, supra note 37 (reporting on homeowners who did everything
the insurance company asked of them and still were not renewed). For another, more dramatic
example, see the Grand Jury Report in 2008—ten years before the Camp Fire—on how to
protect the community of Paradise California from wildfire. Butte County Grand Jury Report
2008/2009 Wildfire & Safety Considerations for Butte County General Plan 2030, BUTTE
CNTY., https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/08-09/Grand_Jury_Report_FY0809-Sec10.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8JY-3A2S] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). It will not be lost on
insurers that the Camp Fire still occurred, even with this introspective mitigation plan, and so
undoubtedly if and when Paradise is rebuilt insurance will either be unavailable or
unaffordable for many.
150.
See, e.g., David Lazarus, California Fires Will Result in Higher Insurance
Rates for Homeowners, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/business/
story/2019-10-31/fire-insurance-david-lazarus-column
[https://perma.cc/F9T9-9HBA]
(quoting Mark Sektnan, vice president of the American Property Casualty Association, as
saying, “Insurers will continue to reflect risk in their rates. As risk increases, so will rates.”).
See generally Christopher J. Conover & Emily P. Zeitler, High Risk Pools (Duke Univ. Health
Ins. Regul., Working Paper No. 1-10, 2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.1090.5411&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
151.
2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, supra note 95, at 6.

2021]

ASHES TO ASHES

707

perils insurance.152 Insurers want to sell lots of insurance. And governments want
lots of safe homes. And so far, none of these efforts have worked.
One might argue that consumers in the hundreds of millions remain wrong
(or ignorant) about the relative costs and benefits of mitigation. Economists argue
that people misvalue high-consequence, low-likelihood risks.153 But if consumer
misperception is the root cause of low voluntary take-up of earthquake and flood
insurance, then correcting misperception plainly is a stickier issue than better
education and information can solve.154 For whatever reason, the market behaves as
if the cost of mitigation does not justify the savings or even the availability of
insurance.155
In sum, if homeowner-level mitigation was the solution to affordability in
high-risk areas and the cost of mitigation did not create unaffordability issues of its
own, then there wouldn’t be ubiquitously unaffordable insurance in high-risk areas.
And requiring mitigation isn’t going to solve the issue of unaffordable insurance in
high-risk areas.
Finally, the CDI proposal requiring supplemental coverage to the FAIR
Plan bears brief discussion. The FAIR Plan has coverage gaps. This CDI proposal
will address those coverage gaps. But it will not make the total premium a
152.
See, e.g., Do I Need Flood Insurance for my Home?, INS. INFO. INST.
https://www.iii.org/article/do-i-need-flood-insurance-for-my-home [https://perma.cc/J3AYDRNK] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); Do I Need Flood Insurance?, ALLSTATE (June 2019)
https://www.allstate.com/tr/flood-insurance/do-i-need-flood-insurance.aspx;
Flood
Insurance: Why You Need a Policy and What It Costs, TEX. DEP’T INS. (May 25, 2021),
https://www.tdi.texas.gov/tips/flood-insurance-cost.html [https://perma.cc/Q3LW-5LQY];
Protect Your Home with Flood Insurance, GEICO, https://www.geico.com/flood-insurance/
[https://perma.cc/RM7M-LMRP] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); ‘What the Flood!’ NAIC Quiz
Helps
Americans
Understand
Flood
Insurance,
NAIC,
https://naicstatic.org/Releases/2019_docs/what_the_flood_quiz.htm
[https://perma.cc/M6S2-UF2P]
(last visited Aug. 2, 2021); The Truth About Earthquake Insurance, LEMONADE,
https://www.lemonade.com/blog/earthquake-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/L8CC-ZV6L] (last
visited Aug. 3, 2021); Fault Lines: Do I Need Earthquake Insurance?, USAA (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.usaa.com/inet/wc/advice-disaster-knowyourquake?akredirect=true; Do You
Need Earthquake Insurance if You Don’t Live on the Coast?, STATE FARM
https://www.statefarm.com/simple-insights/residence/do-you-need-earthquake-insurance
[https://perma.cc/33AF-7SZF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); Earthquake Insurance, CAL.
DEP’T INS.,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/105-type/95-guides/03-res/eqins.cfm [https://perma.cc/FFM7-YDZD] (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
153.
See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Preferences for Insuring Against Probable Small
Losses: Insurance Implications, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67–68 (Paul Slovic ed.,
2000); HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
236–37 (1978).
154.
See generally J. C. J. H. Aerts et al., Integrating Human Behaviour Dynamics
into Flood Disaster Risk Assessment, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 193 (2018) (describing
how the willingness to invest in risk avoidance or reduction measures such as mitigation and
insurance fades over time due to human cognitive factors influencing risk perception, even
though from a purely economic calculus the rationality of the choice has not changed.)
155.
At the risk of belaboring the point, if the cost of mitigation was justified by the
savings realized from available, affordable, insurance, then one would expect to see this
playing out in communities on the ground.
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homeowner pays for “FAIR Plan + private-insurer supplemental coverage” any
cheaper than already unaffordable, private insurance.
B. Kunreuther’s Approach
An important and novel insight of Kunreuther’s approach is his explication
of how manipulation of market incentives can change the availability and
affordability of private All Perils insurance in high-risk communities. The crux of
Kunreuther’s proposal is demand-side focused, requiring homeowners in high-risk
areas to buy coverage for all perils. Kunreuther does not explain the mechanics of
how such a requirement would be structured or enforced. But assuming there is such
an architecture, Kunreuther does not describe his idea as a mechanism to reduce
price but rather as a mechanism to have public support of price through vouchers.156
One might think of Kunreuther’s approach as analogous to the Affordable
Care Act, with the mandate and required coverages, but without community pricing.
Such an approach to insurance is significantly more proactive in addressing the
prevalence of insureds seeking to buy insurance than it is in addressing the cost of
that insurance.157 Put another way, it does a really good job of making sure almost
everyone is insured and does very little to control the cost of the insurance.
For that reason, Kunreuther’s approach may be small solace to the
communities currently suffering a crisis of homeowner insurance availability and
affordability. In those communities, homeowners will be required to buy insurance,
but insurers will not be required to sell it at all, much less at an affordable price. Put
another way, insurers will have no incentive to make that insurance cheaper than it
is today. Rather, Kunreuther’s proposal simply anticipates shifting some
responsibility for paying all or some of the bill from the pocketbook of insureds to
the pocketbook of governments and does so without positioning governments to
bargain on price. It bears noting that there is nothing today that prevents
governments from offering aggressive vouchers to support all perils insurance in
high-risk communities. If governments saw offering aggressive vouchers as a viable
solution, then presumably it already would be happening.
C. French’s Approach
French’s proposal is audacious and comprehensive, and it would work. But
is it politically possible?
French proposes national, public All Perils insurance. French does an
effective job of knocking back many anticipated criticisms to his proposal. In
response to concern about imposing cross-subsidization amongst insureds, he notes
that this argument proves too much because all insurance involves crosssubsidization to one degree or another.158 In response to anticipated political blow156.
Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 147–51.
157.
See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin & John A. Graves, How the ACA Dented the
Cost Curve: An Analysis of Whether or Not the Affordable Care Act Reduced the Annual Rate
at Which Total National Health Care Costs Increased and Brought Per Capita Health
Spending Growth Rates Down, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 403 (2020) (describing how the ACA’s
direct and indirect impacts on the cost of health insurance and the delivery of health care
remains uneven and uncertain ten years after passage of the Act).
158.
See French, supra note 6, at 858–59.
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back based on accusations of socialism, he highlights examples of popular, extant
government programs that are philosophically socialist.159 He recognizes the
perception of some that “America needs less governmental involvement with private
industries, not more,” and he responds that insurance is already highly regulated.160
He deals with the inevitable criticism that insuring natural disasters creates moral
hazard by detailing how these concerns, when pressed back upon and tested, do not
bear out.161 And he squares up to the weary history of public insurance programs—
most notably the NFIP162—as at best poor substitutes for private insurance.163
Specifically, he makes the case that bundling all perils into a single, national policy
would resolve the inefficiencies of public insurance written to cover idiosyncratic
regional risks.164
But what French does not address are the political realities of whether his
proposal could ever actually come to pass. And while generically it might be a
foolish endeavor to try to predict the chances of passing any particular legislative
initiative, there is a lot of clarity on how both the industry and insurance
regulators/legislators would react to French’s proposal.
It is not hard to predict the industry’s reaction. French’s proposal is an
existential threat to an entire profitable industry segment. The NAIC reports that in
2019, for example, Homeowners Multiple Peril Insurance generated over $90 billion
in net premium earned, generating 1.4% in underwriting profits, 3% investment gain
on insurance transactions, and 6.6% gain in net worth.165 To protect these amounts
of profit, the industry reaction will be the same as its reaction to health insurance
proposals to nationalize health care through “Medicare For All”—do whatever it
takes to defeat the proposal.166

159.
Id. at 859–60.
160.
Id. at 861.
161.
Id. at 861–65.
162.
See generally The Cost of Climate, FIRST ST. FOUND. (Feb. 2021),
https://assets.firststreet.org/uploads/2021/02/The_Cost_of_Climate_FSF20210219-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8M28-TS7G].
163.
French, supra note 6, at 865–69 (2020). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D.
Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016).
164.
Id.
165.
Report on Profitability by Line and by State in 2019, NAIC 37 (2020),
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/publication-pbl-pb-profitability-line-state.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NYQ3-ZAF5].
166.
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Care and Insurance Industry Mobilize to Kill
‘Medicare for All’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/us/
politics/medicare-for-all-lobbyists.html; Jeff Stein, ‘We’ve Done a Lot More than You Would
Think’: How the Health-Insurance Industry is Working to Pull Democrats away from
Medicare-for-all, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2019/04/12/weve-done-lot-more-than-you-would-think-how-health-insurance-industry-isworking-pull-democrats-away-medicare-for-all/; P’SHIP FOR AM.’S HEALTH CARE FUTURE,
https://americashealthcarefuture.org/ [https://perma.cc/U6LN-8XG6] (last visited Aug. 4,
2021) (“Build on what’s working . . . not start over”); A Brief History: Universal Health Care
Efforts in the U.S., PNHP, https://pnhp.org/a-brief-history-universal-health-care-efforts-inthe-us/ [https://perma.cc/JX3V-MMPM] (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
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Regulator response will be no better. The NAIC “is governed by the chief
insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S.
territories” and is committed to “state-based insurance.”167 How committed? The
NAIC has created and runs the website, <statebasedsystems.com>.168 Similarly, the
press release of the NAIC marking the organization’s 150th anniversary was subheaded Historical Milestone and Highlights Value of State-based Regulatory
System.169 There is little reason to expect regulators are going to support nationalized
homeowner insurance.
And then there will be the response of state legislators. The National
Council of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) “works to both preserve the state
jurisdiction over insurance as established by the McCarran-Ferguson Act seventyfour years ago,” and “toward that end, NCIOL works to . . . [a]ssert the prerogative
of legislators in making state policy when it comes to insurance” including
“speak[ing] out on Congressional initiatives that attempt to encroach upon state
primacy in overseeing insurance . . . ;” as NCOIL emphasizes, “NCOIL is an
adamant, vocal opponent of any Congressional initiative that would deprive
consumers of key state protections, preempt state laws that respond to unique
insurance markets, [and] threaten critical state premium tax revenue . . . .”170 One
can confidently predict NCOIL opposition.
But what about public support? For some insight, consider the experience
of a “public option” in health insurance—a significant step down from MedicareFor-All. As of this writing, for the first eleven years of the political life of health
care reform resulting in the Affordable Care Act in all of its iterations, a public
option has never even reached a floor vote in Congress.171 And that is despite about

167.
About, NAIC, https://content.naic.org/index_about.htm [https://perma.cc/
XXX4-YH9G] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
168.
About Us, NAIC, https://statebasedsystems.com/solar/about.html [https://
perma.cc/KMM8-9S9N] (last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
169.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to Celebrate
150th Anniversary, NAIC (Jan. 14, 2021), https://content.naic.org/article/news_release_
national_association_insurance_commissioners_naic_celebrate_150th_anniversary.htm
[https://perma.cc/U72K-ZV6D].
170.
History
&
Purpose,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
INS.
LEGISLATORS,
http://ncoil.org/history-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/WS6V-YHKG] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
171.
See generally Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of
the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117 (2010).
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70% public support.172 Medicare-For-All has only about 40% public support.173 The
public perception of a crisis in natural disaster insurance is far less than any public
understanding of a health care insurance crisis. It appears that less than half of the
nation thinks they have a risk of a natural disaster risk at all, and it may be that far
more Americans think they are insured for a disaster such as flood than actually
are.174 There is no groundswell or even sprouting seeds for a public clamoring for
nationalized homeowner hazard insurance.
Functionally, nationalized homeowner hazard insurance has no friends; it
is a political orphan. There are many reasons to worry that French’s proposal—
intelligent and necessary and correct as it is (it would work!)—nonetheless is not
going to happen.

VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Because so much groundwork has been done by the exceptional work of
others, it now is simpler to describe a solution to the sticky problem of insuring
disaster—a solution that threads the needle between the CDI’s approach,
Kunreuther’s approach, and French’s approach, navigating around the shoals of
trouble each of those approaches may founder upon.

172.
Poll: Democrats Like Both the Public Option and Medicare-for-All, but
Overall More People Support the Public Option, Including a Significant Share of
Republicans, KFF (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/polldemocrats-like-public-option-medicare-for-all-but-overall-more-people-support-publicoption-including-significant-share-of-republicans/ [https://perma.cc/AJB3-MLX6]; Nate
Silver, Medicare For All Isn’t That Popular – Even Among Democrats, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(July 25, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/medicare-for-all-isnt-thatpopular-even-among-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/D877-DYPL] (describing MARIST POLL
15, http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/NPR_PBS-NewsHour_MaristPoll_USA-NOS-and-Tables_1907190926.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/L7GC-2632] (last
visited Aug. 5, 2021)).
173.
Silver, supra note 172.
174.
See 2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, supra note 95, at 5–10 (“Among
homeowners, 17 percent say they live in an area likely to experience a wildfire. About a
quarter (26 percent) of homeowners say they live in an area likely to be impacted by a
hurricane, and the same proportion say it is somewhat likely or very likely that their home
would be damaged or destroyed by flooding. In the survey, 41 percent of homeowners said
they took steps to protect their homes from natural disasters, up slightly from 38 percent in
November 2016. . . . In 2020, 27 percent of homeowners policyholders said they had flood
insurance, the highest level since the Triple-I began asking this question in 2007. However,
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) estimates seem to suggest that the percentage of
homeowners who now have its flood insurance policies is much lower. It is possible that those
with homeowners insurance believe they have flood coverage when they actually do not. One
reason this may occur is that homeowners may not fundamentally understand what flood
coverage is and how it works. Or they may think flood coverage encompasses water damage
from a burst pipe instead of a weather-related event like a hurricane or from a river flooding.
While the actual reason may be a combination of these misunderstandings, the discrepancy
between those who have flood insurance and those who think they do presents an ongoing
opportunity for insurers to inform their customers about the need to purchase flood insurance,
whether from the NFIP or a private company.”).
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The starting point is to return to the first premise: insurers want to sell as
much insurance as they profitably can sell. Why don’t insurers already robustly sell
hazard insurance without excluded peril priced in broad, undistorted risk pools?
Because insurers cannot profitably do so. There may be a variety of explanations.175
The intuitively obvious, arguably under-discussed explanation is that competitors
will price cut this product every time. If the market gave the opportunity to profitably
sell All Perils insurance priced in broad, undistorted risk pools, then one would
expect at least one adequately capitalized insurer to be broadly and successfully
selling it, because it would vastly increase gross profits by increasing the size and
value of insurers’ portfolios. There is no such example in the market.
And homeowners would buy it. Roughly two-thirds of homeowners would
have no choice—hazard insurance is required by their mortgage. And many years
of data report that at least three-quarters of the remaining homeowners still buy
homeowner hazard insurance voluntarily. There has never been a moment in recent
decades when, all-in, take-up rates of homeowner hazard insurance have been below
90%.176
As others, including French, have detailed, the tendency of homeowners to
purchase homeowner hazard insurance provides an opportunity. The trick is to
structure insurance markets so that all homeowner hazard insurance is All Perils and
is priced across broad, undistorted risk pools, meaning it is not priced differently
based on a property location. This can be achieved by cobbling together the core
insights of the CDI, Kunreuther, and French. First, states should not approve
homeowner hazard insurance rate filings if such rate filings exclude any natural
disaster perils (Kunreuther).177 Second, states should not approve homeowner
hazard insurance rate filings if such rate filings consider the risk of the disaster
profile of the community that a property is located within (French).178 Finally, states
should require that an insurer who sells anywhere in the states must sell
everywhere.179
This architecture sidesteps the political obstacles of French’s approach,
incorporates the insights of Kunreuther’s approach while filling in its gaps, and
addresses the questions left unresolved by the CDI’s approach. It is somewhat
similar in approach and rationale to a proposal for natural disaster insurance for
Western Europe, despite the distinct differences internally in some respects within
Europe and externally from the United States in both social policy and in the way
the insurance-business segment is structured.180 If all this is done, then insurers will
175.
See generally Howard Kunreuther, All-Hazards Homeowners Insurance: A
Possibility for the United States?, SOC’Y ACTUARIES (Feb. 2017), https://www.soa.org/
globalassets/assets/files/research/projects/2017-02-policy-homeowners-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5MU-29JV].
176.
See supra Section II.A.
177.
See Kunreuther, supra note 37.
178.
See French, supra note 6, at 821–22.
179.
See The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in
Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas
of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 7.
180.
See Donatella Porrini & Reimund Schwarze, Insurance Models and European
Climate Change Policies: An Assessment, 38 EUR. J. LAW ECON. 7, 17 (2012).
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be able to sell such insurance because there cannot be price-cutting through
exclusion of a peril or a high-risk location. Homeowners will have All Perils
insurance priced across broad, undistorted risk pools. And insurers will sell
insurance everywhere because the alternative is to be excluded entirely.
Structurally, any state should be able to adopt this proposal. It is easy for a
state to decline to approve rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance that excludes
coverage for losses caused by fire, wind, water, or earth movement. It is an easy
thing for a state to require that an insurer who sells homeowner hazard insurance
anywhere in a state must offer it everywhere in the state (essentially the CDI
proposal without the escape hatch). But it might appear to be a far harder thing to
use the rate filing review process to eliminate insurers pricing insurance as high-risk
pools property in high-risk areas.
This apparent problem, however, is not an actual conundrum because it is
just a variant of a familiar tension in ratemaking. There is, was, and always will be
tension between insurers and rate-makers concerning how an insurer uses data to
package and re-package risk pools. Insurers always will seek ways to find metrics
that can give an insurer a competitive advantage against other insurers (for example,
credit-scoring or “good grades” discounts in auto insurance), and rate-makers will
always be pressed to dig deep into the metrics being used and evaluate them for
appropriateness.181 For example, rate-makers already dig beneath facially neutral
rate-filings to identify state-identified, inappropriate, potential disparate impact on
insureds on the basis of race.182 This is why it is not hard to identify how to regulate
ratemaking to eliminate insurance isolating high-risk communities in high-risk
pools.183 It merely requires adding a home’s location into the state’s extant list of
identified, inappropriate, and disparate impact factors.

181.
See, e.g., Insurers Don’t Like New Credit Scoring Ban in Washington, but Say
They’ll Follow the Law, INS. J. (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
west/2021/04/28/611881.htm [https://perma.cc/J79R-2GU2].
182.
See, e.g., Michael Ferullo & Roger Yu, Credit-Based Insurance Premiums
Raise Concerns About Racial Bias, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 22, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/insurance/credit-based-insurance-premiums-raiseconcerns-about-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/5P5L-2TMJ] (“Insurance regulators in
Washington and Oregon are pushing to eliminate credit-based insurance scoring in propertycasualty products in the coming year, and legislation has been introduced in several states,
including New York and New Jersey, and at the federal level.”); Brent Kabler, InsuranceBased Credit Scores: Impact on Minority and Low Income Populations in Missouri, MO.
DEP’T INS. (Jan. 2004), https://insurance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf [https://perma.cc/
282C-7MXB ] (“The widespread use of credit scores to underwrite and price automobile and
homeowners insurance has generated considerable concern that the practice may significantly
restrict the availability of affordable insurance products to minority and low-income
consumers.”).
183.
See Manage Wildfire Risk at the Address Level, VERISK, https://www.verisk.
com/siteassets/media/downloads/underwriting/location/location-fireline.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4E43-CQTA] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021); Kathleen Pender, Do You Know Your Home’s
Wildfire Risk Score? Your Insurance Company Does., S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2019, 5:11 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Do-you-know-your-home-swildfire-risk-score-14905676.php [https://perma.cc/AT3A-S525] .
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To repeat then, the architectural approach this Article suggests for assuring
available, affordable insurance responding to all perils is a three-point proposal:
first, an insurer who offers homeowner hazard insurance anywhere in a state must
offer it everywhere.184 Second, rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not
be approved if the insurance would exclude any natural disaster peril.185 Third, rate
filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance
discriminates against homes based on the location of the home.186

VII. ANTICIPATED CRITICISMS
A. Natural Disaster is Not Actually Insurable
As Professors Koursky and Light describe, “economists have developed a
framework of ideal insurability conditions. Namely, to be insurable, risks must be
random, well-enough understood to make pricing and underwriting possible,
diversifiable, and exist in markets with low levels of moral hazard and adverse
selection.”187 The three-point proposal of this Article ticks every box.
The first box—risks must be random—means, as Koursky and Light
explain:
There must be a risk, rather than a certainty. No insurer would write
a policy for a known adverse event at a price less than the full cost
because risk transfer in that situation produces no gain. Therefore,
long-term, inevitable threats such as sea-level rise cannot typically be
insured against. The risk in any given year of tidal flooding, however,
may be insurable.188

Private hazard insurance typically is written year-to-year.189 The
catastrophe-modeling tools estimate the likelihood of a peril occurring and the
impacts should it occur in any given year across an insurer’s portfolio. By this
standard, the perils are insurable.
The second box—pricing and underwriting are possible—means, as
Koursky and Light explain:
[T]he risk must be well-enough understood to allow for pricing and
underwriting. If the risk is not well understood, insurers cannot
determine how much premium to charge or whether a risk is worth
adding to their portfolio. For instance, the insurer may worry about
the potential for catastrophic losses if they price premiums too low or
accept too many high risks. Often pricing is done using historic data,
but also—especially for rare, changing, or uncertain risks—with
184.
This idea is taken from the CDI approach (and slightly modified); it is not part
of the Kunreuther proposal.
185.
This idea is part of Kunreuther’s proposal. See Kunreuther, supra note 37.
186.
This idea is new to the literature.
187.
Carolyn Kousky & Sara E. Light, Insuring Nature, 69 DUKE L.J. 323, 355
(2019).
188.
Id.
189.
See Paul Kleindorfer et al., Single-Year and Multi-Year Insurance Policies in
a Competitive Market, 45 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 51, 52 (2012) (“Insurance policies for
property insurance are normally issued as annual contracts . . . .”).
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modeling. Risks do not have to be perfectly estimated, however, since
insurers can and do charge higher prices for risks that are ambiguous
or difficult to model. But if insurers are too uncertain about a risk,
they may shy away from the market completely.190

It appears this challenge has been solved—perils risk can be acceptably,
accurately modeled.191 Or in the words of two of the largest modelers themselves:
For over 30 years, RMS has led the way in transforming the
catastrophe risk industry, helping organizations make better decisions
to improve human and environmental outcomes. By combining
proven modeling science with powerful advances in technology,
RMS Risk Intelligence solutions enable clients to better assess risk
and reduce uncertainty.192

Need greater accuracy? RMS is known for precision.193
In the case of rare but severe events, historical loss information
has proven unreliable in assessing future loss potential. AIR
Worldwide developed probabilistic models that help
organizations prepare for the financial impacts of catastrophes—
before they occur. Today, organizations use AIR models to assess
the likelihood and severity of loss from catastrophes in more than
110 countries worldwide. AIR models capture how catastrophe
behave and impact insurable assets using sophisticated simulation
models . . . . Detailed output from AIR models is the basis for
understanding and quantifying catastrophe risk. It is the
“currency” by which risk is priced, transferred, and traded, and
applications today go far beyond those within the insurance
industry . . . . the models capture the full range of potential future
catastrophe experience, including the most extreme events that
may not have occurred historically.194
190.
Kousky & Light, supra note 187, at 355–56.
191.
See Tom Larsen, Catastrophe Risk Management, CORELOGIC 1–2,
https://www.corelogic.com/downloadable-docs/2-catriskmgt-0216-01-catastrophe-riskmanagement-021016.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD2W-8DSB] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021)
(“Catastrophe modeling has become ubiquitous in the property insurance industry . . . . The
early adopters . . . capitalizing on information asymmetry—having more information than
their policy holders and competition . . . .”); accord Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell,
Should Governments Provide Catastrophe Insurance?, BERKELEY U.C. (Apr. 2006),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/papers/095BEPress06.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5R6JRDJ].
192.
Cloud-Based Analytics Provide Powerful Risk Insights, RMS,
https://www.rms.com/risk-analytics [https://perma.cc/K3Y4-JVZR] (last visited Aug. 6,
2021).
193.
Discover
How
RMS
Helps
Customers
Outperform,
RMS,
https://www.rms.com/risk-analytics/why-rms-infographic [https://perma.cc/MH4E-LTSU]
(last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
194.
About Catastrophe Modeling, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/models/
About-Catastrophe-Modeling/ [https://perma.cc/2X3U-Q4UV] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021);
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Increasing uncertainty with regard to the severity and frequency
of catastrophic events is challenging the P&C insurance industry
to revisit existing catastrophic risk management and loss
adjustment strategies by improving the overall understanding of
all natural hazards. With 6 continents, 100+ countries/territories,
and 185+ models, CoreLogic has the breadth, depth, and
granularity to get you the data you need, enabling you to stand
with us at the forefront of nxt-level catastrophe modeling.195
Touters tout. But AIR and CoreLogic have gone beyond advertising
puffery—AIR has represented to the federal government that it can and does do
catastrophe modeling down to the granularity of a single property address, and
CoreLogic has represented to the federal government that its granularity reaches to
individual structures within a multi-structure property address.196 Further, the
market has tested these claims, and insurers are using these models and writing
insurance relying upon them.197 It would seem the second box is ticked. And yes,
some insurers are pulling back from insuring some communities.198 But disaster is
everywhere in some form or fashion, and insurers broadly remain in the markets.199
The third box—the risk is diversified—means, as Koursky and Light
explain:
[R]isk pooling must be possible. This requires a substantial number
of insureds whose risks are independent of each other and for which
catastrophic losses are not possible. These are the conditions under
which the average claim approaches the expected value (thanks to the
see Catastrophe Modeling: Why All the Fuss?, MARSH, https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/
research/catastrophe-modeling.html [https://perma.cc/T8MK-XHF6] (last visited Aug. 6,
2021).
195.
Catastrophe Risk Management Solutions, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.
com/protect/catastrophe-risk-management-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/3MM8-TG86] (last
visited Aug. 8, 2021).
196.
FHFA Public Listening Session on Climate and Natural Disaster Risk
Management at the Regulated Entities, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 1:12:10–1:31:55 (Mar. 4,
2021),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Pages/FHFA-Public-Listening-Session-on-Climateand-Natural-Disaster-Risk-Management-at-the-Regulated-Entities.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TNW9-MBBJ] (“Most importantly, in the context of mortgage portfolios, the models
calculate the financial loss . . . . to estimate potential losses from extreme events . . . . at the
property level . . . . we have to get to a property-by-property assessment, and that’s what
we’ve been able to do. So, with the tool that we have built, we’re able to give you a composite
score property by property, centroid by centroid, structure by structure on a property.”).
197.
See, e.g., Our Clients, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/about-air/OurClients/ [https://perma.cc/3VYM-3HTG] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
198.
See Salisbury, supra note 2.
199.
See generally Bethan Moorcraft, More Choice—An Answer to America’s
Gaping Flood Protection Gap, INS. BUS. AM. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.
insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/catastrophe/more-choice—an-answer-to-americasgaping-flood-protection-gap-246475.aspx [https://perma.cc/T6R5-VZUX] (“This is an area
where private flood insurers have an advantage in that most are using cutting edge data
analytics tools . . . . which can differentiate flood risk between neighborhood properties on
the same street . . . .”).
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Law of Large Numbers) and the policyholder’s expected loss will be
approximated by the population’s expected loss (thanks to the Central
Limit Theorem).200

This is the precise problem that is emerging nationally with increasing
frequency, and it is the “availability” focus of this Article, the CDI approach, and
the French approach. The solution is not novel: have broad, undistorted risk pools.
This Article’s three-point proposal addresses this by a “write anywhere, write
everywhere” rule coupled with an imposed form of community pricing. It is CDI’s
idea without the escape hatch.
The fourth and final box—moral hazard and adverse selection—means, as
Koursky and Light explain:
Finally, the market must also be subject to minimal levels of moral
hazard and adverse selection. . . . Insurance premiums in a wellfunctioning private market are directly tied to the risk. Although
regulators may suppress prices, in most private insurance markets,
insurers still charge higher prices for higher risks. This means
insurance markets may be able to create incentives to reduce risk by
rewarding insureds’ investments in risk reduction with lower
premiums.201

French aptly addresses moral hazard and adverse selection concerns.202
This Article does not mean to minimize those concerns. But crucially, in the sphere
of homeowner hazard insurance it does not generally appear that homeowners act in
moral hazard or adverse selection ways. When homeowners are broadly offered
hazard insurance, about 75% or more buy it without regard to perceived peril risk.203
Conversely, when homeowners in a high-risk flood zone are not mandated to buy
flood insurance, most don’t.204 Neither behavior is consistent with the predictions of
the theories of adverse selection or moral hazard. And, of course, under this proposal
most homeowners will not be a position to adversely select; rather, roughly twothirds of homeowners will be required by their mortgage to buy All Perils insurance.
Finally, working within the Koursky and Light articulation of the concern, the
response is to impose mitigation measures into an insurance policy (as the CDI
approach would). Insurers can and should set mitigation standards and cost rewards
in policies. Nothing prevents it. Insurers do it. This criterion too is met.
B. Insurers Will Pull Out of the Market205
Related to the concern that catastrophe is not insurable is the concern that
the more “socialized” insurance is, the less likely insurers are to sell it. Or put more
bluntly, insurers will leave the market.

200.
Kousky & Light, supra note 187, at 356.
201.
Id. at 357.
202.
French, supra note 6, at 861–63.
203.
See supra Section II.B.
204.
See supra Section II.B.
205.
The ideas discussed in this Section supplement the reasons already articulated
by Kunreuther. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 9.
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It would be hubris to guarantee this won’t happen. But given that there are,
for example, over 6,000,000 owner-occupied homes in Florida,206 and all the visible
data indicate that over 90% of these homeowners buy hazard insurance,207 it is hard
to imagine that insurers who can profitably compete in that market will abandon it.
There is a concrete example suggesting that homeowners will not be left
with no provider of private insurance. In the sphere of health insurance, community
rating has resulted in some private insurers refusing to insure but has not resulted in
any community having no options for private insurance.208 This suggests that if all
insurers are playing on a level playing field, such that an insurer does not need to
segment insurance by covered risk or likelihood of an insured experiencing a loss,
then in a carefully structured market private insurers can and will continue to
profitably offer insurance.209
Yet insurers could leave. And if they do, then the market has spoken.
Catastrophe is not insurable by private insurers. But then so too would there no
longer be insurance-industry opposition to the French approach,210 which, in turn,
would be the necessary predicate for the French proposal to blossom into political
reality.
C. It Will Be Unaffordable
A related concern to “insurers will leave” is that insurers will stay but that
this will not be of much help to homeowners, because insurance under this Article’s
three-point proposal will be unaffordable to many homeowners.

206.
QuickFacts Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/FL/RHI725219 [https://perma.cc/74RE-K2D8] (last visited Aug. 8,
2021).
207.
Claire, supra note 72.
208.
Five states—Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont—
have community rating and were able to have private insurers offer coverage in the time of
mandated purchase of health insurance. See generally PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
Challenges of Partial Reform–Lessons from State to Reform the Individual and Small Group
Market Before the Affordable Care Act, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. (Feb. 2017),
https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PDF-ChallengesStateReformBefore
ACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL8P-QVSL]; Justin Giovannelli & Kevin Lucia, State
Experiences Show Why Repealing the ACA’s Premium Subsidies and Individual Mandate
Would Cripple Individual Health Insurance Markets, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/state-experiences-show-why-repealingacas-premium-subsidies-and-individual-mandate-would [https://perma.cc/5VGF-YPGH].
Even in the absence of mandated health insurance, there is no place in the United States that
has no private insurer offering health insurance, and in these five states every place has
multiple private insurers. County by County Plan Year 2020 Insurer Participation in Health
Insurance Exchanges, CMS, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/HealthInsurance-Marketplaces/Downloads/Final-2020-County-Coverage-Map.pdf [https://perma.
cc/B5FL-YMY9] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
209.
See Matthew Fielder, Taking Stock of Insurer Financial Performance in the
Individual Health Insurance Market Through 2017, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/individualmarketprofitability.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6RL-ZLYH].
210.
See supra Section V.C.
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That is a hard concern to address because, before this Article, there has not
been a publicly reported calculation of what private, All Perils insurance would cost
a homeowner on average. Indeed, there has not been any publicly reported data set
from which such a calculation could even be easily derived.
Any discussion of what this sort of insurance would cost must start with
this: Insurers either know or could easily calculate what it would cost. The challenge
is to get an idea of cost from public-facing information.
As Koursky details, “[t]he thorny theoretical problems involved in
estimating the economic consequences of disasters are coupled with extreme data
limitations that make actual estimates far from what would be the hypothetical ‘true’
disaster costs.”211 Or, put more simply, it is hard (nigh on impossible) to get good
public data.
In theory, the calculation could be straightforward—divide the total
economic damage to owner-occupied homes in a state in a year by the number of
owner-occupied homes in the state in that year, and then adjust the resulting figure
by profit and overhead factors to result in average per home direct premium. But it
is difficult to isolate state-by-state, regional, or event-level aggregation of
catastrophe loss to owner-occupied homes that can be matched to the number of
potentially insurable homes in the footprint of the aggregated loss.212 This requires
data on both insured and uninsured-but-insurable losses,213 isolated to owneroccupied homes. Available data are overinclusive or underinclusive, or both.
Further, what data are available are reported as economic loss, which is different
from cost to insure, as it excludes the administrative and profit components of
privately insuring.
California, for example, when studying wildfire, only collects data on
insured loss.214 In 2018, California reported that insured losses to homes totaled
$11.4 billion, but did not report total losses, whether insured or uninsured.215 And
complicating matters further, this data included losses without disaggregation to
“Homeowners; Condominium Unit Owners; Mobile Home; Tenants/Renters;
Dwelling Fire and Allied Lines; and Lender/Force-Placed and Real Estate Owned
211.
Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate Adaptation: A Review of the Economic
Costs of Natural Disasters, 46 ENERGY ECON. 576, 580 (2014).
212.
See email from Seth Christensen, Tex. Dep’t Emer. Mgmt., to Author (Feb.
10, 2020, 9:37 AM) (on file with author) (responding to a public records request, officially
representing that the State has no such data); email from Joan Batten, Pub. Recs. Coordinator
for Fla. Off. Ins. Regul., to Author (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:45 AM) (on file with author) (responding
to a public records request, describing the nature of the data the State has and does not have).
213.
Researchers using a Monte Carlo simulation tool found that in the United
States, uninsured expected property loss from natural catastrophes should exceed insured loss.
Thomas Holzheu & Ginger Turner, The Natural Catastrophe Protection Gap: Measurement,
Root Causes and Ways of Addressing Underinsurance for Extreme Events, 43 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS.–ISSUES & PRAC. 37, 48, fig.3 (2018).
214.
Email from Camilo Pizarro, Manager, Cal. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 3, 2020,
3:34 PM) (on file with author).
215.
Insured Losses from the 2018 California Wildfire, CAL. DEP’T INS.,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2019/upload/nr041-19Insured
Losses2018Wildfires050819.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6VB-Z4FN] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
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(REO).”216 Put another way, the data did not support isolating uninsured, insured
losses to owner-occupied homes.217
California is not an outlier. State governments simply do not collect data
on economic losses—insured and uninsured—to owner-occupied homes. In
response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request on all economic losses
to homes (whether insured or not) in Florida in 2017, the Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation reported that it performed a data call on Hurricane Irma (the only major
storm hitting Florida in 2017) but did not collect any data on uninsured losses, and
it suggested the Florida Division of Emergency Management might have collected
data on uninsured losses.218 The Florida Division of Emergency Management
reported it did not “have records that would show monetary damages to homes” but
perhaps the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation would.219 Similarly, the author
of the flood analysis work commissioned by the State of Texas220 confirms that he
has no data on uninsured loss.221 Nor does the State of Texas Department of
Insurance.222
Similarly unhelpful is NOAA data on flood loss. While NOAA tracks
economic direct damage from floods, “the NOAA loss estimates include damage
from freshwater flooding and rainfall from hurricanes, but they omit damage from
other coastal flooding (e.g., storm surge) [and] . . . it is likely that a substantial
portion of flood-related direct damage is to uninsured property.”223
One of the most comprehensive public-facing studies is the work done by
the City of Houston after Hurricane Harvey. The City of Houston estimates that in

216.
Id.
217.
Email from Luciano Gobbo, Manager, Cal. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 4, 2020,
2:58 PM) (on file with author) (stating that California’s reported data on residential property
loss does not disaggregate data “further than personal residential property, commercial
property, auto, and other. Thus personal residential property includes homeowners, dwelling
fire, tenant/renters, condo, mobile home, etc. and was not reported by the different types.
Tenant/Renters provides coverage to one’s content regardless if individual lives in an
apartment complex or in a single family home.”).
218.
Email from Joan Batten, Pub. Recs. Coordinator Fla. Off. Ins. Regul., to
Author (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:45 AM) (on file with author) (responding to a public records
request, describing the nature of the data the State has and does not have, to Author).
219.
Email from Sherin Joseph, Attorney, Fla. Dep’t Emergency Mgmt., to Author
(Sept. 20, 2019, 11:55 AM) (on file with author).
220.
Rebuild
Texas,
CTR.
FOR
TEX.
BEACHES
&
SHORES,
http://www.texascoastalatlas.com/TexasAtlas/splash%20screen/splash.html [https://perma.
cc/VL26-WUJC] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
221.
Email from Sam Brody, Lead Technical Expert, Governor’s Comm’n to
Rebuild Tex., to Author (Dec. 13, 2019, 8:18 AM) (on file with author).
222.
Email from Marianne Baker, Dir., Property & Casualty Div.—Prop. &
Casualty Lines Div., Tex. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 4, 2020, 9:11 AM) (on file with author)
(“We don’t collect data on damages to homes that were uninsured.”).
223.
Framing the Challenge of Urban Flooding in the United States, NAT’L ACADS.
OF SCIS., ENG’G, & ME. 32, https://doi.org/10.17226/25381 (last visited Aug. 08, 2021).
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2017, Hurricane Harvey caused $16 billion in residential damage.224 That figure
does not disaggregate owners from renters, single-family units from multi-family
units from group homes, or on-site construction from manufactured homes.225
Industry data is no better. In the insurance industry, catastrophe risk
modelers do not have this data. For example, CoreLogic, self-described as at the
“forefront of next-level catastrophe modeling,”226 disclaims that it has “any data on
the breakdown by percentage, within insurable causes, of residential total losses
(entire structure—whether including foundation or not—requires reconstruction)
that are caused by natural disasters causes vs. any other causes.”227
Reinsurer Swiss Re estimates globally “the expected uninsured losses from
natural disasters of USD 153 billion annually.”228 That figure makes no distinction
between whether the loss was to a home or some other type of property such as an
apartment or business, nor breaks down the figure by nation.
In the end, there is no obvious public data set to base a calculation of what
it would cost an average homeowner to buy private All Perils insurance. But obvious
data is different from “no data.” There is some public-facing data. Deep in work
performed for the NAIC, an accounting firm, Milliman, has a stray line where
Milliman estimated “the potential private residential flood insurance market to
represent between $34 billion and $48 billion in direct written premium.”229 The
calculation was developed from “an input file representative of single-family
homeowners in contiguous United States;” “assumed ‘policy limits’ similar to a
homeowners policy——full insurance to value for building coverage, plus
additional coverage for contents, ALE, other structures;” “used multiple catastrophe
models to estimate and AAL an insurer might use;” and “built in an estimated
expense range for all expenses[] and covered loss plus LAE plus anything else
included in running the business——in other words, the actual cost to the collective
insureds in paid premium if all covered losses were fully covered (the coverage
224.
The Harvey Data Project: City of Houston Housing and Community
Development Department, CITY HOUSTON TEX. 2 (Mar. 2019), https://www.houstontx.
gov/postharvey/public/documents/3.2019-havrvey-data-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5B6BDV].
225.
Local Housing Needs Assessment: Hurricane Harvey Housing Recovery, CITY
HOUSTON TEX. 105–60, https://houstontx.gov/housing/plans-reports/Local-Housing-NeedsAssessment-112818.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAE4-MWGL] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
226.
Catastrophe Risk Management Solutions, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.
com/solutions/catastrophe-risk-management.aspx [https://perma.cc/TAS8-M4DC] (last
visited Aug. 8, 2021).
227.
Email from Sarah Jakubiak, Pro. Exec. Assistant, CoreLogic, to Author (June
26, 2020, 7:16 AM) (on file with author) (responding to request for clarification following a
CoreLogic webinar on natural disaster loss modeling).
228.
Swiss Re Ltd., Underinsurance of Property Risks: Closing the Gap, RISK &
INSURANCE
1,
https://riskandinsurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Swiss-Re_
Underinsurance-of-property-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU32-PT5C] (last visited Aug. 24,
2021).
229.
Considerations for State Insurance Regulators in Building the Private Flood
Insurance Market, NAIC 11–12 (Nov. 19, 2019), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/
national_meeting/CATWG%20materials%20without%20agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
55HW-R4BS] (pages 73–74 of pdf).
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limits were adequate to fully cover the loss).”230 Thus, Milliman had calculated the
total in annual premiums all homeowners would pay if every homeowner in the
United States had flood insurance.
Milliman’s work can be used to derive an approximate cost of direct written
premium for private residential All Perils insurance based on the ratio of insured
flood peril to all perils. Steve Bowen, a Director and Meteorologist for Aon, is Aon’s
Head of Catastrophe Insight within its Impact Forecasting Department and one of
the authors of Aon’s Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight 2019 Annual
Report.231 I asked Mr. Bowen:
In a typical year, of all annual economic loss from natural
disasters in the United States, what percentage of economic loss
is due to flood? For these purposes, I define “economic loss from
flood” as a loss that if one had a flood insurance policy, then
coverage would respond.232
He answered:
Flood is a broad term that includes riverine, flash flood, storm
surge, coastal flood and is often bucketed within different perils –
namely tropical cyclone, severe convective storm, or winter
weather. These impacts are typically incurred via direct costs to
property, vehicles, infrastructure, agriculture, and net-loss
business interruption. Only a fraction of these economic damage
costs is covered by insurance. In the case of damage to homes and
businesses, less than 10 percent of US homeowners have NFIP
policies.
With these metrics in mind, I can provide you some numbers with
broad assumptions that does include a fair amount of uncertainty.
The mainland U.S. has averaged $80 billion in economic damage
from natural disasters since 2000 (all values inflation adjusted to
2020 USD). Based on some assumptions to account for floodrelated impacts from tropical cyclones, thunderstorms, and winter
storms, that roughly equates to $27 billion; or about one-third of
annual direct disaster-related economic costs.233
Applying the 27/80 ratio to Milliman’s figures results in a range of annual
average direct written premium for all economic damage from natural disasters to
owner-occupied homes in the United States of about $100.74 billion to $142.22
billion.

230.
Email from Nancy Watkins, Principal & Consulting Actuary, to Author (Feb.
26, 2020, 6:16 PM) (on file with author) (responding to follow-up questions about a
presentation Ms. Watkins made to the NAIC).
231.
Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 81.
232.
Email from Author to Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe
Insight Impact Forecasting, Aon (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:20 PM) (on file with author).
233.
Email from Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe Insight
Impact Forecasting, Aon, to Author (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:18 PM) (on file with author).
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This ratio, in turn, can be used to calculate an average per house cost of
direct written premium for every owner-occupied house in the United States. As of
July 1, 2019, U.S. Census Bureau statistics describe 89,397,916 owner-occupied
homes in the United States.234 Spreading the total calculated direct premium across
every one of these homes results in a “back of the envelope” per home direct
premium range of $1,127–$1,591.
This calculation comes with a host of assumptions and caveats. It calculates
a per house cost, but insurance premiums are not per house capitated235 within
underwriting pools. It is calculated by spreading data nationally, but insurance is
priced—even in its theoretically broadest form—on a state-by-state basis.
Milliman’s figures have a very broad error range, and the model then builds on that
range using Bowen’s numbers, which he self-describes as based on a “fair amount
of uncertainty.”236 Aon’s numbers are across residential, commercial, and
agricultural numbers,237 and so the resulting ratio calculation assumes that the ratio
holds regardless of whether the impact is confined to only one of these spheres. Also,
the denominator may be suspect—the most recent American Housing Survey
suggests that in 2017, there were only 72,526,000 owner-occupied attached or
detached homes which were not “Manufactured/mobile home or trailer” (a different
sort of insurance policy) or “Other” (boat, RV, van, etc.).238
Nonetheless, this calculation allows at least some analysis of whether the
proposal of this Article will cost too much. There are some other data calculations
that suggest $1,127–$1,591 per house might be in the ballpark. In 2017, the average
premium nationally for HO-3 coverage for homes was $1,211, with Louisiana being
most expensive at $1,968 and Oregon being least expensive at $677;239 in 2017, fire
and lightning, wind and hail, and water damage and freezing accounted for 92.8%
of all property damage claims made on HO-2, HO-3, and HO-5 homeowners
insurance policies;240 and HO-3 is coverage for wind and fire but not flood and
earthquake.241 Using ISO loss estimates and U.S. Census Bureau data, economic fire

234.
Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/WTZ8-EVBJ] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (stating
that there were 139,684,244 housing units as of July 1, 2019, multiplied by the owneroccupied housing unit rate, 2014–2018, of 64%).
235.
See, e.g., How Home Insurance Premiums Are Calculated, TD INS.,
https://www.tdinsurance.com/products-services/home-insurance/tips-advice/premiumcalculations [https://perma.cc/7PWP-UJR6] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
236.
Email from Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe Insight
Impact Forecasting, Aon, to Author (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:18 PM) (on file with author).
237.
Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 78.
238.
See American Housing Survey (AHS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas
=00000&s_year=2017&s_tablename=TABLE1&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergr
oup1=2&s_filtergroup2=1 (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (click “Get Table”).
239.
2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108–10.
240.
Id. at 111.
241.
For a more fulsome discussion of the HO-3 form, see Report Providing an
Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the
United States, supra note 7, at 14–15, 18–26.
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losses in the United States in 2018 cost just $133.21 per capita,242 which if multiplied
out by the 2018 population of the country (about 330 million243) and then divided
by the Census Bureau’s figure of 89 million owner-occupied homes244 equates to
$494 per house. That figure leaves plenty of room for coverage of other perils and
for insurer overhead and profit. And finally, French calculates the cost of his
approach as $1,171.245
But is the cost, assuming it is $1,127–$1,591, affordable? For an individual
homeowner, that will be an idiosyncratic answer. But what is clear is that this cost
would not be a deviation of significance from what homeowners already, on
average, are paying. It bears repeating that the I.I.I. reports as to the most recent year
for which it has collected data, and in 2017, the average expenditure of U.S.
homeowners for insurance for hazard insurance was $1,211.246
D. Homeowners Will Not Want It
A closely related concern to “homeowners can’t afford it” is that
homeowners can afford it but won’t choose to buy it. Put another way, homeowners
who can afford All Perils insurance will perceive it as costing too much—it just will
not be perceived as a good buy. Or put in the jargon of economists, there will be
significant price elasticity. This is an important concern to square up to, because
economists recognize that insureds undervalue low-probability, high-consequence
risks.247
Whatever the theoretical concern about price elasticity, it does not bear out
in the real world of buying peril insurance. Kunreuther summarizes the prior
research confirming that, “by bundling hazards into a single policy, property owners
are likely to perceive the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase
coverage prior to experiencing a disaster.”248 Further, as summarized above, other
research confirms that over 90% of homeowners do have and want hazard insurance
and are not price elastic about the cost.
An equally encouraging response to price elasticity concerns is a 2020
paper empirically evaluating homeowner willingness to purchase All Perils
insurance. Global pricing of property insurance rose 20% in the fourth quarter of

242.
2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 166.
243.
U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/5YMZ-Z7MX] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
244.
Quick Facts, supra note 235.
245.
French, supra note 6, at 859.
246.
2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108.
247.
See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Robert Meyer & Erwann Michel-Kerjan,
Overcoming Decision Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafer, ed. 2013) (“[I]ndividuals often
utilize informal heuristics that have proven useful . . . but that are likely to be unsuccessful
when applied to the kind of low-probability, high-stakes decisions they are now facing in a
catastrophic environment.”); accord Andrew Royal, Dynamics in Risk Taking with a LowProbability Hazard, 55 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 41 (2017).
248.
Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 143.
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2020 and an additional 15% in the first quarter of 2021.249 That said, Landry et al.
specifically studied the willingness of homeowners to pay for All Perils coverage
and found that the premium homeowners were willing to pay for All Perils insurance
was $3,393.65–$4,396.93, while a homeowner who has separately purchased “flood
insurance, wind insurance, and a standard homeowners policy pays on average
$3,152 in premiums for all three types of coverage.”250 In other words, this Article’s
proposal apparently is well within the price elasticity pain point for All Perils
coverage.
E. It is Politically Untenable
There will be concern about the political headwinds that this three-point
proposal may face. Natural disasters affect people and communities differently. The
cost of insurance breaks differently amongst different communities. These
differences can create political tensions that regulators and legislators must
anticipate and navigate.
1. Rich v. poor
As alluded in the discussion of cost, what is a good buy to one person is a
barrier to entry to another person. A $1,211 hazard insurance policy is a great buy
for a $1,000,000 home and a far less attractive price for a $50,000 home. The median
home value of owner-occupied homes in the United States is $200,000,251 which
suggests that a state could think of the predicted price as “per $200,000 of home
value” rather than “per house” and thus understand the affordability of all perils in
that state.
Of course, this sort of re-framing only goes so far. If one compares the 2017
reported median home values in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia,252 with average
insurance premiums for homeowner insurance in those states in 2017,253 there is no
correlation. Home value is a dependent variable, but far from the only one.
The most obvious “other” variable would be the risk profile of a property.
The impact of that variable will be reduced under this Article’s three-point proposal
to whatever degree a state decides to do it. There could be a single, state-wide riskpool, or something less.

249.
Matthew Lerner, Global Price Increases Slow in Q1, BUS. INS. (May 4, 2021),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20210504/NEWS06/912341621/Globalinsurance-price-increases-slow-in-Q1-Marsh- [https://perma.cc/FBD6-N73J].
250.
Landry et al., supra note 67, at 22.
251.
American Housing Survey, supra note 92.
252.
The American Housing Survey tracks median home values for California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Virginia; however, for Colorado and Ohio there is no reported 2017 data. See American
Housing Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/
interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00008&s_year=2015&s_tablename=TABLE13&s
_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filtergroup2=1 (last visited Aug. 8,
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2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108–10.

726

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63:1

But under any approach there will be income disparities. There will be rich
households who do not need any insurance premium reduction but will realize it.
And there will be poor households who either have a premium increase they cannot
afford or an insufficient premium reduction to gain entry to the housing market.
Restructuring the homeowner insurance market will not solve these wealth
inequity issues. That is what governments do through programs such as subsidies
and vouchers.254 But these issues should not be ignored.255
2. Racial injustice
In the context of this Article’s proposal, wealth disparity and racial
injustice are related concerns. Eroding homeowner insurance availability and
affordability inevitably erodes homeownership.256 Communities of color suffer a
homeownership gap.257 And lack of ownership may have unexpected, knock-on,
negative effects beyond concerns about intergenerational wealth accumulation. For
example, literature suggests that “variations in home ownership may contribute to
persistent racial and socioeconomic health inequities.”258 The availability of disaster
254.
See Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 147–49 (arguing for government response
to cost inequity but also arguing that vouchers are highly preferred to subsidies).
255.
See Robert E. Litan et al., Easing the Homeowners’ Insurance Crisis on the
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, DOCPLAYER (Oct. 2007), https://docplayer.net/15624827-Easingthe-homeowners-insurance-crisis-on-the-atlantic-and-gulf-coasts-robert-e-litan-1-franknutter-2-marc-racicot-3.html [https://perma.cc/3BTV-BG6V].
256.
See generally Flood Insurance Coverage of Federal Housing Administration
Single-Family Homes, supra note 78, at vii–viii, 27–39, 42–43 (higher flood insurance
premium amounts correlate to likelihood of mortgage loan default); accord Clifford V. Rossi,
Assessing the Impact of Hurricane Frequency and Intensity on Mortgage Default Rates, FED.
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 25, https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Documents/HurricaneImpactAnalysis–
DrCliffordRossi.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MG8-BYNL] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (describing
how increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes increases mortgage default rates).
257.
Laurie S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the American
Dream, 32 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 36–37 (2018); accord Lindsay Owens, Soaked: A
Policy Agenda to Prepare for a Climate-Triggered Housing Crash, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY
11 (July 2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Documents/ClimateandHousingReport–DrLindsay-Owens.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V8E-BQDT] (asserting communities of color “are
even more likely to be impacted by climate change and to experience blight and abandonment,
as they are less likely than white communities to be aided and rebuilt.”).
258.
Roshanak Mehdipanah et al., Neighborhood Context, Homeownership and
Home Value: An Ecological Analysis of Implications for Health, 14 INT. J. ENV’T RSCH. PUB.
HEALTH 1098, 1098 (2017). See generally William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The
Effects of Homeownership: On the Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of
Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 173 (2007) (showing that homeownership
results in a significant increase in life satisfaction); Glen Bramley & Noah Kofi Karley,
Homeownership, Poverty and Educational Achievement: School Effects as Neighbourhood
Effects, 22 HOUS. STUD. 693 (2007) (discussing how homeownership affects school
attainment); Dalton Conley & Brian Gifford, Home Ownership, Social Insurance, and the
Welfare State, 21 SOCIO. F. 55 (2006); Urb. Inst., Climate and Natural Disaster Risk
Management Request for Input, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.fhfa.gov//AboutUs/Contact/Pages/input-submission-detail.aspx?RFIId=1442
(click “FHFA Climate RFI - Urban Institute Response.pdf”). But see Stephanie M. Stern,
Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011).
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mitigation resources specifically also can break differently on racial lines.259 The
point here is simple and disquieting: insurance unavailability and unaffordability
can exacerbate racial injustice in the United States.
This Article presents only an economic proposal. In other words, this
proposal does not explicitly address environmental racism, but this proposal also
should not be considered independently of understanding whether it exacerbates,
ameliorates, or is neutral to environmental racism. Disparate impacts are a moral
and political reality that any governmental action always must account for.
The issue is an enormous one and is a paper in itself—well beyond this
Article. But it would seem, at least on an intuitive level, that making homeowner
insurance more affordable and available is helpful, not hurtful, on metrics of
environmental racism.
3. Industry opposition
There is an obvious reason that insurers will be less concerned with this
Article’s three-point proposal than with the French approach—this proposal does
not seek to eliminate their business. But is it enough?
It is too simplistic to postulate that the insurance industry will act as a single
entity, unanimous amongst its component companies, and oppose. Arguably this
proposal is actually positive for the industry as a whole. More gross risk will be
covered. Most dramatically, the take up rate of coverage of earthquake and flood
peril should rise to about 90%.
As Kunreuther articulates, risk must be actuarily and soundly written.260
This Article’s proposal in no way assumes that insurers will price risk other than
profitably. If take-up of earthquake and flood insurance rises from less than 20
percent to over 90 percent, then even if profit margins do not change, gross profits
will. They will rise—dramatically. There are no restrictions on covered risk, in
gross, being profitably underwritten. And so gross industry underwriting profits will
rise. And if gross profits across the industry segment rise, then the industry should
be, on the whole, enthused.
But as with all things, there will be winners and losers. Insurers who
anticipate profiting from the proposal will support it. Other insurers will have the
opposite calculus and oppose. Most notably, small insurers who can write regionally
but not statewide will oppose.

259.
See, e.g., James R. Elliott et al., Racial Inequities in the Federal Buyout of
Flood-Prone Homes: A Nationwide Assessment of Environmental Adaption, 6 SOCIUS 1, 12
(2020) (“[R]acialization is now occurring in new ways that provide more opportunities to
whiter communities to participate in the latest wave of federal flood mitigation, while leaving
neighborhoods of color more likely either to consent or face future flood risks. This dynamic
is not a contradiction. It is how privilege seems to work in the age of climate change . . . . It
brings more options and public resources to those living in more socially advantaged spaces,
especially if they own property, while leaving those in socially marginalized spaces more
reliant on government assistance that is not only less likely to come but less trusted when it
does.”).
260.
Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 146–47.
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No doubt, the instinctive response of the industry to any restriction on
ratemaking is negative. But the industry is the very opposite of emotional and
precipitous in its actions; the lifeblood of insurance is cold data analytics.261 If this
proposal pencils out positively for the industry as a whole, then the weight of the
industry will support it.
4. Public insurers
There is a politically attractive aspect of this proposal: it removes public
entities from the uncomfortable position of public insurer of last resort. One might
characterize the NFIP as the poster child for, in French’s words, “a failing insurance
program.”262 But it’s not as if any other public insurance product is thriving. There
is no example of public peril insurance of last resort that the offering state
government wants to offer.
5. Each state is different
Finally, there is the concern that different states experience natural disaster
differently, because “generally, an insurer is required to obtain approval from the
state insurance regulator for all of the homeowner insurance policy forms that the
insurer intends to use in that state.”263 Or put another way, for some states there is a
crisis, but for others there may not be one. And that’s fine. This solution is not a
“one-size-fits-all-states” proposal. It is a template for each state to react to or not as
the state’s needs dictate.
6. Maybe some homes should not be rebuilt
Sometimes natural disaster survivors are asked, “Did you rebuild on the
same lot?” To which the answer often is “yes,” because many homeowners
understandably prefer to go home rather than move somewhere else and start over.264
And, of course, the land the lost home sat upon is the only lot the homeowner owns.
The questioner probably is asking a question about fear; after all, there is now at
least one stark data point that this home’s location is a dangerous place for a home
to be.
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See, e.g., Bethan Moorcraft, Show Me the Money – Insurers See Benefits of
Data and Analytics, INS. BUS. AMERICA (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.
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2030—The Impact of AI on the Future of Insurance, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 12, 2021),
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See Roadmap to Recovery Surveys, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS,
http://uphelp.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (click “Media,” then click “Survey Results;”
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The data point frames a political Hobson’s Choice: No politician wants to
publicly put hurdles in the path of victims getting home. That said, maybe one lesson
from a flood, for example, is that building a home next to this particular river is the
last place the politician should want homes to be built. Put simply, affordable,
adequate, and available insurance in high-risk communities is not an unambiguous
societal good.265
This Article’s proposal cannot solve that political conundrum. This Article
simply says that if building codes and zoning codes determine that homes can exist
in a location, then here is a method to insure those homes in an adequate way. And
it is a way to make sure that climate change survivors can get back home if
politicians wish to support that choice.
7. The cost of inaction
Every political calculus has two sides (at least!) to the equation. A final
factor in the political calculus should be the cost of inaction. Awareness of
catastrophe risk destabilizes real-estate markets and makes property more
expensive.266 As Governor Lael Brainard of the Federal Reserve remarked in March
of 2021:
[C]limate-related risks . . . could manifest as shocks or increase
financial system vulnerabilities or both. One example is property and
casualty insurance . . . . embedding vulnerabilities that could result in
cascading losses in the event of large-scale adverse weather outcomes
or other shocks to asset valuations. . . . As we have seen in California
and in Florida, insurance companies can pull back from insuring
properties and facilities in geographic areas subject to heightened
flood or fire risk or seek to raise rates on these properties and facilities
to more accurately reflect risks. Although such changes may
ultimately result in a more accurate assessment of actual risks, the
abrupt changes to a wide range of contracts that embed systemic
mispricing could initially amplify the shock. It is also increasingly
apparent that the value and, in some cases, the usability of real estate
in many areas will be directly affected by the increased risks of flood,
wildfires, severe storms, and sea-level rise associated with climate
change. The direct effects on homeowners . . . can have severe effects
on safety and the usability of properties. As climate risks grow over
time, the mortgages on these properties may become riskier . . . .267
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In sum, the political cost of inaction may well swamp any political costs of
changing the current structure of insurance markets.

CONCLUSION
After Hurricane Harvey, the City of Houston found that the storm had
caused an aggregate of $16 billion in property damage to residences; the economic
impact was not distributed evenly; the storm was “especially hard” on people who
already were “socially vulnerable;” only slightly more than $3 billion of that damage
was covered by Federal assistance programs; “[a] majority of the remaining funds
will be covered by non-Federal sources, such as private insurance, individual
savings, or local recovery funds;” and there would be $2 billion—perhaps even $3
billion—of “remaining unmet need for seriously damaged homes.”268 Houston’s
experience with Hurricane Harvey is not extraordinary. It is emblematic of the new
normal. There is an urgency for ubiquitously available, affordable private insurance
for all perils. It is the only way home. This Article provides a path forward for that
to occur.
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